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Emotional Common Sense as
Constitutional Law
Terry A. Maroney
62 Vand. L. Rev. 851 (2009)
In Gonzales v. Carhart the Supreme Court invoked postabortion regret to justify a ban on a particularabortion procedure.
The Court was proudly folk-psychological, representing its
observations about women's emotional experiences as "self-evident."
That such observations could drive critical legal determinations
was, apparently, even more self-evident, as it received no mention at
all. Far from being sui generis, Carhart reflects a previously
unidentified norm permeating constitutionaljurisprudence:reliance
on what this Article coins "emotional common sense." Emotional
common sense is what one unreflectively thinks she knows about
emotions. A species of common sense, it seems obvious and universal
to its holder-but this appearanceis misleading.
This Article articulatesand evaluates the Court's reliance on
emotional common sense in constitutional law. It demonstrates that
emotional common sense sometimes imports inaccurate accounts of
the world into the law. Justices of every ideological orientation
invoke it in a manner that comports with their desired ends.
Emotional common sense colors interpretationof evidence, manifests
in selective perspective-taking, and shapes jurisprudential choices.
Common-sense evaluation of emotions also necessarily embodies
underlying beliefs and values; enforcing them on others under the
guise of simple truth silently forces a false consensus.
Emotional common sense has a
limited place in
constitutional law. It may be cautiously embraced where an
emotional phenomenon is relatively basic and universal. In all
other cases, the embrace should be withheld. Evaluating isolated
instances in which the Court has looked beyond emotional common
sense, this Article shows that a superiorpath exists.
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INTRODUCTION

Horse sense. The brains you were born with. Sense enough to
come in out of the rain. We respect those who have it and deride those
who do not. Similarly, we value the ideas that appear to us as simple
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truths. You can't have your cake and eat it too. All that glitters is not
gold. Don't bite the hand that feeds you.
What unites these themes is the concept of "common sense."
Commonly defined as "sound practical judgment,"1 one meaning of
"common sense" is having "the knack for seeing things as they
are,
and doing things as they ought to be done." 2 Common sense is, then, a
faculty that people have. But the term also has a second primary
meaning, signifying unreflective knowledge not reliant on specialized
training or deliberative thought. 3 This type of common sense, which
we might also call "folk wisdom," is experienced by the holder as
simple truth. 4 Ideas, then, also may have common sense; they can be
commonsensical.5 These dual notions that together comprise common
sense unite in their source and location: lived experience. Further,
they are necessarily intertwined. One who has common sense is in
touch with common-sense ideas, and such ideas emerge from the lived
experiences of those commonsensical enough to perceive them.
Common-sense ideas animate legal decisionmaking. Some have
claimed that common sense is the "hidden transcript" of law, the
"underlying and unconscious framework" guiding judgments as
varied
as witness credibility, 6 marital property division, 7 the insanity

1.
RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 413 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1993);
see also 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 454 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993)
(defining "common sense" as "[glood sound practical sense in everyday matters; general
sagacity").
2.
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN MAXIMS 76 (David Kin ed., 1989) (quoting H.W. Shaw).
3.
MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 232 (Frederick C. Mish ed., 10th ed.
1993) (additionally defining the term as "unreflective opinions of ordinary people"); 1 THE NEW
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 454 (additionally defining the term as
"[tihe faculty by which certain beliefs are generally accepted without philosophical enquiry or
influence from religious teaching etc.").
4.
Common-sense ideas often are encapsulated as proverbs. See WOLFGANG MIEDER,
PROVERBS ARE THE BEST POLICY: FOLK WISDOM AND AMERICAN POLITICS 1 (2005) (explaining
that proverbs are an indispensable part of the "treasure trove of folk wisdom").
5.
Frits Van Holthoon, Common Sense and Natural Law: From Thomas Aquinas to
Thomas Reid, in COMMON SENSE: THE FOUNDATIONS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE 99, 99-114 (Frits Van
Holthoon & David R. Olson eds., 1987) [hereinafter COMMON SENSE]. These twin aspects of
common sense were in Greek referred to as koine nous and koine ennoia, and came in Latin to be
referred to by the unitary term sensus communis. S.E.W. Bugter, Sensus Communis in the Works
of M. Tullius Cicero, in COMMON SENSE, supra, at 83-84 (explaining that koine ennoia signified
"the notions all men have in common"; koine aisthesisthe "common root of our senses"; and koine
nous, the "elementary mental outfit of normal man'). This Article is primarily concerned with
that aspect of common sense signified by koine ennoia: ideas that appear obvious and universal.
The Aristotelian concept of an uiber-sense unifying all others has not survived as an aspect of the
contemporary understanding of common sense and is not discussed here.
6.
Richard H. Thompson, Common Sense and Fact-Finding:Cultural Reason in Judicial
Decisions, 19 LEGAL STUD. F. 119, 119-22, 125-29, 134 n.17 (1995) (citing JAMES C. SCOTT,
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defense, 8 and jurors' assessment of eyewitness identifications. 9
Though relatively unexplored in the legal literature, common sense is
a crucial element in judicial decisionmaking, including in
constitutional jurisprudence. 10 Indeed, a recent citation study claims
that common sense, though seldom scrutinized by scholars, was "the
single most cited authority for an argument" the researchers could
identify. 11
Consider Gonzales v. Carhart.12 In upholding the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, the Carhart majority declared that
"[r]espect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of
love the mother has for her child," that "it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant
life they once created and sustained," and that "[s]evere depression
and loss of esteem can follow" abortion. 13 Further, according to the
majority:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only after the
event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human
form. 14

Chock-full of assertions about love, regret, grief, and sorrow,
these passages are proudly folk-psychological. The Carhart Court
explicitly prefaces its comments by noting that it has "no reliable data
to measure the phenomenon" of post-abortion regret; instead, it

WEAPONS OF THE WEAK: EVERYDAY FORMS OF PEASANT RESISTANCE (1983)) (noting that there
are few efforts to "address 'common sense' as a legal concept").
7.
William R. Riddell, Common Law and Common Sense, 27 YALE L.J. 993, 993-97 (1918).
8.
Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: "OrdinaryCommon Sense"
and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3, 4-7 (1990); Michael L. Perlin, "She Breaks Just Like
a Little Girl" Neonaticide, The Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of "Ordinary Common
Sense," 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 24-29 (2003). My formulation of "emotional common
sense" owes its rhetorical flavor to Perlin's "ordinary common sense."
9.
Richard E. Redding, How Common-Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and
PsychologicalResearch, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 113 (1998).
10. David E. Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning, Social Change, and the Law, 81 NW. U.
L. REV. 894, 934 (1987) ("[The promulgation of most legal rules is based on commonsense
judgments about the world.").
11. Ronald J. Allen, Common Sense, Rationality, and the Legal Process, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
1417, 1428-29 & n.39 (2001) (asserting that "[t]he words and phrases 'common sense,'
Icommonsensical,' and 'sensible,' used as an argument (based on crude sampling) appear
upwards of 70,000 times in Westlaw," but noting that "[tihis almost surely grossly understates
the reliance on common sense as an argument, for the concept is often invoked in different
terms").
12. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
13. Id. at 159.
14. Id.
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presents its observations about women's emotional experiences as
"unexceptionable" and "self-evident." 15 The notion that such
observations can and should drive critical legal determinations is,
apparently, even more self-evident, as it receives no mention at all.
Importantly, the Carhart majority invokes its common-sense
views about a very specific domain of human experience: our emotions.
It invokes what this Article calls emotional common sense. Carhart is
an exceptional case in many respects. 16 In one important respect,
however, it reflects a hidden and previously unidentified practice:
relying on emotional common sense when construing law.
"Emotional common sense" is what one thinks she simply
knows about emotions, based on personal experience, socialization,
and other forms of casual empiricism. It is a deep, rich topic, as
emotions form an integral part of the common sense we both bring to
and receive from our lives. Indeed, much folk wisdom revolves around
emotions. We operate on the basis of common-sense views of emotions'
function in human life, their causes and manifestations. Hope springs
eternal; 17 there is nothing to fear but fear itself;' 8 love is blind.' 9 We

15. Id.
16. Much of the extensive post.Carhartcommentary has focused on this same aspect of the
opinion, though none offers the analysis provided here. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Carhart,
ConstitutionalRights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 877, 877 (2008) (arguing
that the opinion shows a "fundamental misunderstanding of the psychology of regret"); Posting of
Julia Frank to Balkanization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (May 7, 2007, 7:05 EST) (explaining
that it is a common misconception that abortion causes psychiatric disorders); Posting of Andrew
Koppelman to Balkanization, http://balkin.blogspot.com (Apr. 23, 2007, 18:12 EST) (questioning
whether regret is a legitimate reason to curtail constitutional liberties). Numerous
commentators have claimed that the above-cited passages mark a radical shift, calling them
"startling," Jeffrey Toobin, Five to Four, NEW YORKER, June 25, 2007, at 35, and "a major
departure from how the court has framed the abortion issue for the past 34 years," Linda
Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women from Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at
A18; see also Tony Mauro, Kennedy Swings, Abortion Rights Take Hit, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 23,
2007, at 8 (noting that Kennedy's opinion was a "radical departure" from his stance in previous
abortion cases); Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkanization, http:/fbalkin.blogspot.com (Apr. 19,
2007, 14:50 EST) ("The new rhetoric of pro-life forces is no longer just rhetoric. It's now part of
Supreme Court doctrine. That is the big news about Gonzales v. Carhart.").
17. THE BOOK OF POSITIVE QUOTATIONS 377 (Steve Deger & Leslie Ann Gibson eds., 2d ed.
1993) [hereinafter POSITIVE QUOTATIONS] ("Hope springs eternal in the human breast." (quoting
Alexander Pope)); see also id. at 376 ("Hope is the poor man's bread." (quoting Gary Herbert)); id.
at 374 ("Hope is griefs best music." (quoting Anonymous)); id. ("Hope is a vigorous principle...
it sets the head and heart to work, and animates a man to do his utmost." (quoting Jeremy
Collier)); id. at 373 ("Hope is the last thing ever lost." (quoting an Italian proverb)).
18. Id. at 477 ('The only thing we have to fear is fear itself-nameless, unreasoning,
unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance." (quoting
Franklin Delano Roosevelt)); see also id. at 479 ("He who fears something gives it power over
him." (quoting a Moorish proverb)).
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also call on common-sense ideas about the legitimacy and reliability of
the information emotion imparts and the conclusions it compels. To
find happiness, follow your heart; 20 loss shows us what's really
important; 21 listen to your fears. 22 And, like all common sense,
emotional common sense is thought to spring from the laboratory of
life. As Descartes once said, because "every one has experience of the
passions within himself, there is no necessity to borrow one's
observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature."23

19. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES 270 (Burton Raffel ed., Random House,
Inc. 2008) (1400); see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 2, sc. 6 ("But
love is blind, and lovers cannot see/The pretty follies that themselves commit.").
20. See POSITIVE QUOTATIONS, supra note 17, at 421 ("It is wisdom to believe the heart."
(quoting George Santayana)); id. at 422 ("It is the heart always that sees, before the head can
see." (quoting Thomas Carlyle)); id. C'The conclusions of passion are the only reliable ones."
(quoting Soren Kierkegaard)); see also id. at 35 ("With happiness comes intelligence to the
heart." (quoting a Chinese proverb)); id. ("Best trust the happy moments ....
The days that
make us happy make us wise." (quoting John Masefield)).
21. See id. at 678 ("Suffering is the sole origin of consciousness." (quoting Fyodor
Dostoyevsky)); id. ("Pain makes man think. Thought makes man wise. Wisdom makes life
endurable." (quoting John Patrick)); THE MACMILLAN BOOK OF PROVERBS, MAXIMS, AND FAMOUS
PHRASES 1040 (Burton Stevenson ed., 1948) C'Grief should be the instructor of the wise."
(quoting Lord Byron)).
22. POSITIVE QUOTATIONS, supra note 17, at 490 ("Fear is a fine spur." (quoting an Irish
proverb)); id. ("Fear is an instructor of great sagacity." (quoting Ralph Waldo Emerson)); id. ("A
good scare is worth more to a man than good advice." (quoting Edgar Watson Howe)). See
generally GAVIN DE BECKER, THE GIFT OF FEAR: AND OTHER SURVIVAL SIGNALS THAT PROTECT
US FROM VIOLENCE (1997) (explaining that acts of violence are not random and unpredictable
and that our instincts tell us when we are in danger).
23. RENt DESCARTES, THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (1649), reprinted in WHAT IS AN
EMOTION? CLASSIC READINGS IN PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 55, 55 (Cheshire Calhoun &
Robert C. Solomon eds., 1984) [hereinafter WHAT IS AN EMOTION?].
The "general sagacity" aspect of common sense, too, has an emotional counterpart: persons
with particular skill in perceiving and responding to emotional dynamics are, in pop parlance,
referred to as "emotionally intelligent." See DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: WHY
IT CAN MATTER MORE THAN IQ 33-39 (10th anniversary ed. 2005) (explaining that IQ is not
always an accurate predictor of success and that our "other characteristics," such as ability to
motivate oneself and to empathize with others, are gaining new recognition). The concept of "EQ"
as a rival to "IQ" has spawned a cottage industry of theories and products. See, e.g., Consortium
for Research on Emotional Intelligence in Organizations, http://www.eiconsortium.org (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009) (describing the mission of the EI Consortium "to advance research and
practice of emotional and social intelligence in organizations through the generation and
exchange of knowledge"). Such emotional "horse sense" is, of course, intertwined with the sort of
emotional common sense explored in this Article, in the same way that the twin aspects of
common sense more generally are intertwined. See supra note 6-11 and accompanying text. An
emotional reaction to particular stimuli will shape what perceptions of and conclusions about
that situation appear commonsensical. The greater degree to which the perceiver is "emotionally
intelligent," the greater the "reliability" of those assessments. However, as this Article will
demonstrate, even "reliable" assessments of emotion by "emotionally intelligent" persons are
profoundly bounded.
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If common sense has, despite its importance, received relatively
little attention, the extent to which emotional common sense animates
legal decisionmaking has been overlooked entirely. 24 It does animate
legal decisionmaking; and, like other iterations of common sense, its
invocation has both virtues and-perhaps more commonly-vices.
This Article articulates and evaluates emotional common sense
as constitutional law. It undertakes this task within a deliberately
25
confined universe of inquiry: decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Given its high profile and the relative openness with which the Court
imports its emotional common sense, Carhart provides an analytical
window into this previously unquestioned phenomenon. Emotional
common sense is not, however, confined to abortion jurisprudencethough it is quite active there. A focus on the phenomenon reveals
hidden dynamics in areas as diverse as free speech and the crossexamination of child witnesses.
In Part I, this Article further dissects the concept of "emotional
common sense." As a species of "common sense," it reflects the merits
and limitations of that category. Indeed, it is perhaps one of the most

24. A small literature identifies certain phenomena falling within what this Article calls
emotional common sense. See NORMAN J. FINKEL & W. GERROD PARROTT, EMOTIONS AND
CULPABILITY: HOW THE LAW IS AT ODDS WITH PSYCHOLOGY, JURORS, AND ITSELF 47-66 (2006)
(describing the "everyday concept of emotion"); Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105
YALE L.J. 1023, 1044-47 (1996) (arguing that emotion should be recognized for the important
role that it plays in judicial opinions); Doni Gewirtzman, Our Founding Feelings: Emotion,
Commitment, and Imaginationin ConstitutionalCulture, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 623, 677-83 (2009)
(arguing that emotion should play a role in constitutional law). The degree to which judges do or
should call upon their own emotional reactions to guide their jurisprudential choices also is the
subject of a small (but growing) literature. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion,
and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 3-5 (1988) (praising Cardozo for
recognizing emotion in judicial decisionmaking); Laura E. Little, Adjudication and Emotion, 3
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 205, 218 (2002) (explaining that emotion plays a role in the law but needs an
"organizing principle" to ensure that it does not interfere with judicial values); Benjamin
Zipursky, Note, DeShaney and the Jurisprudenceof Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1102
(1990) (suggesting that including emotion in judicial decisionmaking would reach a better result
in many cases). This Article deals but briefly with that aspect of emotional common sensewhich might be termed an emotional faculty of perception as opposed to perceptions about
emotion-leaving a fuller exploration for another day.
25. To say that emotional common sense operates "as" constitutional law incorporates
several concepts. It may be used as a tool of legal reasoning or allowed to influence perception
and evaluation of relevant facts; it may drive a legal determination or be invoked post hoc as a
justification. This Article explores each of these manifestations.
The Supreme Court may be no more prone than other lawmaking institutions to invoke
emotional common sense. And while it is possible that constitutional jurisprudence is more
emotionally saturated than other areas of law, see infra Part III, this should not be presumed.
The lessons learned within this confined universe, then, may be taken to other areas of law and
to the decisions of other legal actors. Further, the present analysis is largely confined to
contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence; a historical analysis would be well worth
undertaking.
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entrenched sorts of common sense, as-compared to, say, naive
physics-many believe folk wisdom is the only sort of wisdom to be
had about emotions. Common sense may be regarded as
epistemologically legitimate, even privileged, or derided as the crude,
uninformed view of the layperson. But whether valorized or
denigrated, common sense clearly is shaped and bounded by time,
place, and culture; though it may seem simple truth to its holder,
others may hold very different views similarly believed to be
commonsensical. And just as its epistemological value may be
contested and its cultural limits variable, its proper relationship to
law is far from clear.
Part II undertakes a "thick description" of emotional common
sense within constitutional law. 26 Judgments about emotion are
inevitable in constitutional law. Evaluation of a particular emotional
experience, such as the impact of seeing a burning cross, sometimes is
necessary to application of the relevant constitutional standard.
Beliefs about the prevalence or nature of emotional experiences, such
as post-abortion regret, may affect the valuation of state interests and
may be invoked to expand or limit individual rights. 27 The Court has
never displayed any sustained inclination to regard emotions with
anything other than a lay perspective. The emotional common sense it
therefore brings to these challenges is operationalized just as is all
common sense: instrumentally, with spotty reliability, and
incorporating a strong evaluative component.
First, emotional common sense has an uneasy relationship
with empirical truth. Sometimes the Court's folk judgment is in
substantial accord with the weight of empirical evidence. At other
times it significantly conflicts with the weight of such evidence-the
Court adopts, as it were, "old wives' tales."28 One important goal
therefore would be to reduce instances of the latter. But not all
emotional common sense can be characterized as "correct" or not. Most
common-sense notions, after all, have an equally well-accepted
opposite. Which is true: Absence makes the heart grow fonder, or out

26.

The term "thick description" was coined by Gilbert Ryle in his Collected Papers.

CLIFFORD GEERTZ,
INTERPRETATION].

THE

INTERPRETATION OF

CULTURES

5-6

(1973)

[hereinafter

GEERTZ,

27. Further, common sense ideas may sometimes be grounded in emotion; issues such as
wartime powers, affirmative action, and eminent domain provoke strong passions, and a
Justice's emotional engagement with an issue may shape what facts and conclusions appear to
her commonsensical. See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://mw4.m-w.com/dictionary/
old%20wives'%20tale (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (defining "old wives' tale" as "an often
traditional belief that is not based on fact" and as synonymous with "superstition").
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of sight, out of mind?29 It depends on how much you value the absent
person and her return. Members of the Court, then, do precisely what
people in general do: they (likely unconsciously) invoke one or the
other view, either of which is plausible, depending on how well it
moves them toward their desired conclusion. 30
The weightier point, then, is that emotional common sense is
instrumental and value-laden. The Justices' emotional common sense
reveals important information about their affiliations, beliefs, and
values, and it will be invoked in a manner that comports with their
desired normative ends. A deep analysis therefore seeks not merely to
judge whether the Court's view is "correct," for there may be
"conflicting correct" views. 31 Rather, it seeks also to uncover what
emotional common sense reveals about the Justices' underlying
worldviews. Analysis of key abortion protest cases reveals that
emotional common sense both colors interpretation of evidence and
manifests in selective perspective-taking. And, as a deeper reading of
Carhart shows, reliance on emotional common sense may ignore
relevant emotional diversity and serve as a cover for highly contested
beliefs and values.
Part III offers a proposed valuation of emotional common sense
as part of our constitutional jurisprudence. Though the full reach and
implications of this newly described phenomenon surely will unfold
over time, it is possible to start that dialogue here. This Part proposes
that emotional common sense be cautiously embraced-or at least
tolerated-where the legal determination involves extremely basic
emotions as manifested in everyday settings, for in that instance
emotional common sense may be so likely to be accurate as to be an
acceptable source. The (limited) embrace should be largely withheld,
though, where the Court is asked to evaluate complex emotions,
particularly those of other people. In these situations, the inaccuracy,
instrumentalism, and parochialism to which common sense is
vulnerable are most likely to be at play. The Court should be
particularly attuned to situations in which the emotion in question is
amenable to significant diversity, for emotional common sense may

29. See Robert Epstein, Folk Wisdom: Was Your Grandmother Right?, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Nov. 1997, at 46, 47 (giving as another example "birds of a feather flock together" versus
"opposites attract").
30. This is precisely the point that Llewellyn made regarding canons of statutory
interpretation. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396-97 (1950)
(asserting that courts will select among available correct answers according to, inter alia, "the
sense of the situationas seen by the court").
31. Id. at 395.
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push in the direction of a false consensus. The Court should allow
other perspectives meaningfully to educate its views-and
occasionally, as this Part will show, it does. Finally, where (as
frequently will be the case) external evidence is unavailable, in
equipoise, or admits of conflicting correct views, the Court's choices
should be defended as normative ones and not presented as simple
statements of obvious truth.
Emotional common sense is importantly operative within
constitutional law. It is not simple truth accessible to all; it is complex,
unstable, and norm-laden. This Article makes it visible. Once visible,
it may be evaluated. Once evaluated, it may be channeled.
I. EMOTIONAL COMMON SENSE
Weaving together multidisciplinary insights on common sense
and wedding them to contemporary psychological research on
emotions, this Part presents a unified concept of emotional common
sense. Common sense, despite its camouflage as a fixed, stable notion
signifying nothing more than the quality of having one's head screwed
on correctly and the truths perceived by persons with their heads thus
correctly screwed, 32 is a concept with a rich and fluid intellectual
history. Emotional common sense, like all common sense, is better
suited to some tasks than others and is profoundly shaped by culture.
These attributes make emotional common sense a potentially unstable
partner with law.
Common sense-to begin the inquiry by defining the attributes
of the larger category-is thought to both originate and manifest in
lived experience. Commonsensical ideas spring from the laboratory of
life, through direct personal experience and lessons imparted-both
33
implicitly and explicitly-by one's family, peers, and culture.
Education and analytic reflection are not necessary to common sense,

32.

See, e.g., CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE

ANTHROPOLOGY 83 (1983) [hereinafter GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE] (pointing out that notions
striking the Navajo as commonsensical, or "what anyone with his head screwed on straight
cannot help but think," will seem "peculiar" to non-Navajo persons).
33. See, e.g., Paul E. Meehl, Law and the FiresideInductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical
Psychologist, 27 J. SOC. ISSUES, Winter 1971, at 65, 67-68 ("A shrewd lawyer... [may be] right
in holding to what he learned at his grandmother's knee or through practical experience."). The
same point applies to the faculty-of-perception aspect of common sense. Someone with high
intelligence, for example, may reveal herself to be bereft of common sense by reacting poorly to
everyday tasks, relationships, and challenges. See POSITIVE QUOTATIONS, supra note 17, at 411
("Many persons of high intelligence have notoriously poor judgment." (quoting Sydney J.
Harris)); see also GEERTz, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 76 (quoting Saul Bellow: "the
world is full of high-IQ morons").
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and folk wisdom holds that they might actually be destructive to its
thriving. As Gertrude Stein once quipped, "Everybody gets so much
information all day long that they lose their common sense." 34
A second defining feature of common sense is its relative
invisibility. It is more commonly "appealed to rather than defined,"
"assumed [rather] than defended."35 Like Poe's purloined letter, it "lies
so artlessly before our eyes it is almost impossible to see," 36 and it
often is invoked for the rhetorical purpose of accusing an opponent's
position of being nonsensical. 3 7 However, as the eminent
anthropologist Clifford Geertz proposed, common sense is not simply
"what anyone clothed and in his right mind knows" but, rather, "a
relatively organized body of considered thought" whose order may be
empirically uncovered and conceptually formulated. 3s In all its
iterations, Geertz demonstrated, common sense shares the
characteristics of being natural, practical, thin, immethodical, and
accessible.
The naturalnessof common sense captures its "of-courseness,"
the way in which it represents matters as "being what they are in the
simple nature of the case." 39 It is practical in the sense that it both
takes as its object that which is necessary to manage the challenges of
everyday life and conveys a person's aptitude for managing such
34. DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 966 (Alison Jones ed., 1997) (quoting Gertrude Stein,
Reflections on the Atomic Bomb, in READINGS IN WORLD POLITICS 491, 491 (Robert A. Goldwin
ed., 1959)).
35. Frits Van Holthoon & David R. Olson, Common Sense: An Introduction, in COMMON
SENSE, supra note 5, at 1, 1; see also GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 77
(explaining that common sense is an "assumed phenomenon" rather than an "analyzed one").
36. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 92. Geertz was one of few serious
contemporary scholars to dissect the concept of common sense. Common Sense as a Cultural
System, a lecture given at Antioch College in the 1960s that later appeared as an article and,
finally, as a chapter in Local Knowledge, represents his most specific analysis. See ADAM KUPER,
CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT 102 (1999) (noting, though, that common sense was
"[a]mong the least well defined elements" of Geertz's impressive "conceptual apparatus").
37. To say that one's point is common sense is to say one's conclusion is the one at which all
but the most obtuse must eventually arrive. See Van Holthoon & Olson, supra note 35, at 1
(noting its tactical and strategic value). This is the purpose for which Thomas Paine invoked the
term; his argument had nothing to do with common sense per se. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON
SENSE (Thomas P. Slaughter ed., Bedford/St. Martin's 2001) (1776); see also Allen, supra note 11,
at 1420 (pointing out that "common sense" appears in Paine's work only three times and was
used to refute "claims of privileged access to truth").
38. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 75-76 (asserting that such a view is
profoundly counter to the concept itself, for "it is an inherent characteristic of common-sense
thought precisely to deny this and to affirm that its tenets are immediate deliverances of
experience, not deliberate reflections upon it"); see also Thompson, supra note 6, at 121 (quoting
Geertz to explain that common sense is viewed as self-evident, unlike other "systems of
meaning").
39. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 32, at 85.
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challenges. 40 To say that common sense is thin might be phrased
instead as simple or literal: "the world is what the wide-awake,
uncomplicated person takes it to be."4 1 Its immethodical tendency is
captured by the "shamelessly and unapologetically ad hoc" nature of
its content, often displayed in wildly contradictory proverbs rather
than in "formal doctrines, axiomized theories, or architectonic
dogmas." 42 Finally, to say that common sense is accessible recognizes
its egalitarian nature. Any person "with faculties reasonably intact
can grasp common-sense conclusions," for it is a field with "no
43
acknowledged specialists," one that is "open to all."
These attributes pull in opposite directions. Natural,practical,
and accessible sound positive; common sense helps us make our way
through the world as it is, and it is democratically distributed rather
than residing only with trained elites. But thin and immethodical
sound negative, as if common sense were skating erratically on the
surface of other, deeper, more consistent sorts of knowledge. And,
indeed, both characterizations are true. 44 Moreover, both apply fully to
the type of common sense that revolves around human psychology, 45
40. Id. at 87 (explaining that the practicality aspect captures the "folk-philosophical sense
of sagacity").
41. Id. at 89.
42. Id. at 90.
43. Id. at 91; see also id. at 93 (explaining that common sense often also reflects
"earthiness," as displayed in such phrases as knowing "your ass from your elbow").
44. These tensions are responsible for many of the historical vacillations around common
sense. Extolled by the Greeks and Romans as a bond of common humanity, during the European
Enlightenment it came to be seen as "the sum of common ignorance that had kept the human
race in the bonds of servitude," to which the studied ideas of "intellectuals" were the antidote.
Allen, supra note 11, at 1421; see also E.J. Hundert, Enlightenment and the Decay of Common
Sense, in COMMON SENSE, supra note 5, at 133, 138-40 (explaining that during the
Enlightenment, common sense was seen as a form of "superstition and prejudice" that separated
the enlightened community from ordinary people); Edmund V. Sullivan, Common Sense from a
Critical-HistoricalPerspective, in COMMON SENSE, supra note 5, at 217, 217-18 (noting that
common sense historically has appeared in a contradictory light). Common sense was embraced
in the United States because of its "democratic appeal in its privileging of the viewpoint of the
common man." Charles L. Barzun, Note, Common Sense and Legal Science, 90 VA. L. REV. 1051,
1071 (2004). For the philosophical debate over common sense, see JOHN COATES, THE CLAIMS OF
COMMON SENSE: MOORE,

WITTGENSTEIN,

KEYNES AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1996); Van

Holthoon, supra note 5, at 111.
45. Common-sense ideas abound about any number of subjects, such as physics and
medicine. See Barry Smith & Roberto Casati, Naive Physics: An Essay in Ontology, PHIL.
PSYCHOL., Sept. 1994, at 227, 227-44 (discussing common sense in naive physics); Online
Archive
of
American
Folk
Medicine,
How
to
Search
the
Archive,
http://www.folkmed.ucla.eduhowto.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (containing a collection of
material "intended as a resource for historical, sociological, and folkloristic research"). That
subset of common sense about psychology is the site of much academic debate. See RICHARD S.
LAZARUS, EMOTION AND ADAPTATION 14 (1991) (noting "considerable discomfort with what is

called, often snidely, naive or commonsense psychology"); B. de Gelder, Commonsense Mentalism
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including emotions. These competing aspects of common sense are
particularly relevant, because emotion generally is regarded as being
so firmly within the province of common sense that most people would
be puzzled by any other sort of approach. 46
Given the tensions inherent in the category, much of the task
of contemporary scholars of common sense has been to chart a middle
course in which it is valued for what it offers and discounted for what
it does not. 47 That effort has yielded several core insights that inform
assessment of the proper relation between emotional common sense
and law.
First, folk wisdom is empirical, though casually so, in that it is
based on human observation and experience, accumulated and passed
on over time. 48 Thus, emotional common sense will embody certain
truths that appear both universal and stable. 49 For example, the
common notion that emotions are involuntary, quick, and can
temporarily overwhelm other mental operations is generally true with
50
regard to a small set of evolutionarily basic emotions, such as fear. It

and Psychological Theory, in COMMON SENSE, supra note 5, at 277, 277-78 (noting also that
common sense generates "considerable uneasiness" in psychology); Harold H. Kelley, CommonSense Psychology and Scientific Psychology, 43 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (1992) (defining
commonsense psychology as "common people's ideas about their own and other persons' behavior
and about the antecedents and consequences of that behavior," expressed in "familiar sayings
and stories").
46. Emotional common sense therefore is one of the most powerful forms of common sense.
See Gerald L. Clore & Karen Gasper, Feeling Is Believing. Some Affective Influences on Belief, in
EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS: How FEELINGS INFLUENCE THOUGHTS 10, 39 (Nico H. Frijda et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS] ("[B]ecause emotional feelings are directly
experienced, and arise from within, the personal validity of the information they appear to
convey seems self-evident ....
").
47. Kelley, supra note 45, at 22 (discarding commonsense psychology "would require us
needlessly to separate ourselves from the vast sources of knowledge gained in the course of
human history" and is "unrealistic"); Thomas Luckmann, Some Thoughts on Common Sense and
Science, in COMMON SENSE, supra note 5, at 179, 179 ("Just as it is pompous to deny that there is
some sense in common sense merely because it is so common, it is being pretentious in reverse
fashion to say that common sense is the only sense there is."). But see Gregory A. Kimble, A New
Formula for Behaviorism, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 254, 258 (1994) ("The current fad of seeking truth
in intuition, argument, common sense, and literature accepts these other understandings
without apparent comprehension that they may not be the same as, or even compatible with,
scientific truth.").
48. Meehl, supra note 33, at 78. In this sense, it is much like modern empirical science,
though decidedly less organized. See, e.g., Luckmann, supra note 47, at 194 ("The 'home base' of
modern science is also the 'home base' of common sense.").
49. Kelley, supra note 45, at 2 ("[A] great many of psychology's basic principles are selfevident... [and psychologists] have often been dealing with the obvious and did not know it."
(quoting John P. Houston, Psychology: A Closed System of Self-Evident Information?, 52
PSYCHOL. REP. 203, 207 (1983))).
50. See, e.g., JOSEPH LEDOUX, THE EMOTIONAL BRAIN: THE MYSTERIOUS UNDERPINNINGS OF
EMOTIONAL LIFE 129-34 (1996) (describing the emotional fear response to dangers in humans
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also is largely true that-as most people believe-feelings of fear carry
vital information about danger. 51 To the extent that emotional
common sense imports into law such stable insights, then, its use is
either innocuous or positive.
Second, and in direct contrast to the first point, folk wisdom is
often inaccurate and will embody not stable truth but, rather,
distortion, myth, and bias.52 It is most likely to be accurate when
referring to familiar, consciously accessible phenomena, and it will be
far less so when directed to rapid, nonconscious, largely invisible
ones. 53 For example, emotional common sense may be generally
reliable when it concerns everyday experiences, such as the way
emotions feel. We easily can call to mind the somatic incidents of
happiness, such as feeling "light hearted" and smiling, and such
accounts will likely vary little across a population. We are
significantly less likely to have sound folk beliefs about the bodily
mechanisms underlying the distinctive declarative thoughts and
physical sensations of happiness. This blind spot, common to virtually
all nonconscious processes, also shields from view certain systemic
distortions-referred to as heuristics and biases when applied to

and animals and its proclivity to overwhelm other emotions and thoughts). Even this insight is
limited, though, as it fails to account for the sheer diversity of emotions and emotion-eliciting
situations. See Klaus R. Scherer, Evidence for Both Universality and Cultural Specificity of
Emotion Elicitation, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 172, 175 (Paul

Ekman & Richard J. Davidson eds., 1994) [hereinafter THE NATURE OF EMOTION] (noting that
emotions and emotional responses to situations are affected by cultural variations).
51. DE BECKER, supra note 22 (providing a "pop psychology" treatment of fear as
information); see also POSITIVE QUOTATIONS, supra note 17, at 420 ("A trembling in the bones
may carry a more convincing testimony than the dry, documented deductions of the brain."
(quoting Llewelyn Powers)).
52. Indeed, this point reaches to the very foundation of folk wisdom about the emotions:
though laypersons tend to regard them as universal, basic, and easily recognized, distinguished,
and understood, virtually no academic psychologist would agree. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law
and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155, 167 & n.64 (2005)
(describing the human "tendency not to recognize that emotions themselves are complex"). The
many academic psychologists who believe that some emotions are universal, basic, and easily
recognized and understood believe the set to be a small one. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 45, at
79 (noting comfort with the idea that "some emotions are more or less universal within the
human species"); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Some Reasons to Expect Universal Antecedents of
Emotion, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 50, at 150, 150-51 (noting that there is some,
but not much, evidence for common emotion elicitors); Nico H. Frijda, Universal Antecedents
Exist, and Are Interesting, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 50, at 155, 155-57
(presenting evidence for the existence of universal emotions); Jaak Panksepp, The Basics of Basic
Emotion, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supranote 50, at 20, 22 (asserting that there is something
"basic" about emotions).
53. Kelley, supra note 45, at 6 (noting that folk wisdom is most accurate when directed to
"immediate and direct consequences, time-spans of minutes to days, and face-to-face interaction
of small numbers of people").
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cognitive processes-to which emotion is vulnerable and of which we
54
are not aware.
The nonconscious aspect of our emotional experience is not the
only area in which common sense shows blind spots. Importantly,
similar inaccuracies will plague emotional common sense when used
to surmise and evaluate the experiences of others, particularly
dissimilar others, and will tend toward imposition of a "false
consensus" in which we wrongly assume their emotional lives to be
like our own. 55 If emotional common sense imports into law such
inaccurate suppositions, its use is either innocuous-if, for example, it
concerns a tangential matter unlikely to be given weight in future
cases-or negative.
Third, emotional common sense is inseparable from culture.5 6
It is shaped and bounded by culture, which imposes on our emotions
"a recognizable, meaningful order, so that we may not only feel
but
54. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 397-420 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002)
(introducing a theoretical framework for analyzing the impact that perception biases have on
decisionmaking). For example, we are easily misled into misattributing the causes of our
emotions. See JESSE PRINZ, GUT REACTIONS 12-13 (2004) ("A state of arousal may be interpreted
as resulting from some emotionally significant event even when it really results from another
source."); Blumenthal, supra note 52, at 162 n.38 ("[I]t seems intuitive that the experience of an
affective state is conscious in the sense that one 'knows' one is angry, sad, elated, or aroused ....
But this intuition may be wrong .. ").Another example is systematic error in predicting the
intensity and duration of emotional reactions to future events. Blumenthal, supra note 52, at
167.
55. Blumenthal, supra note 52, at 179-80 & nn.155-57 (2005) (describing "false consensus
effect" and "egocentric empathy gaps"); see also id. at 190 & n.225 ("[P]redictions regarding
others may be even less accurate [than predictions we make as to ourselves].... [Some] data
suggest that the more different an outsider is from the target of a prediction, the less accurate
predictions will be."); Kelley, supra note 45, at 6 (stating that common beliefs about groups of
people are often "exaggerated at best, and wholly inaccurate at worst").
56. The concept of culture admits of many contested definitions. It here is taken to signify a
more or less "concrete and bounded world of beliefs and practices" generally isomorphic with an
identifiable society or sub-group within a society. WILLIAM H. SEWELL JR., LOGICS OF HISTORY: SOCIAL

THEORY AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION 156 (2005); see also GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26,
at 4-5 (explaining that textbook definitions of culture embrace concepts as diffuse as "the total
way of life of a people" and "a storehouse of pooled learning"); Sherry B. Ortner, Introduction to
THE FATE OF "CULTURE": GEERTZ AND BEYOND 1, 7 (Sherry B. Ortner ed., 1999) (describing
competing definitions of "culture").
Dan Kahan and colleagues in the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School have
designed a series of empirical studies around a different-but not conflicting---concept of
"culture." They use two fundamental orientations-hierarchist versus egalitarian and
individualist versus communitarian-to divide subjects into cultural orientation quadrants. See,
e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Cultural Cognition as a Conception of the Cultural Theory of Risk 6
(Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 73, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=l 123807 (describing hierarchy-egalitarianism and individualism-communitarianism).
This approach is well suited for empirical survey research but necessarily less thick than that
undertaken here.
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know what we feel and act accordingly." 57 The influence of culture is
relatively obvious for complex social emotions-for example, what
causes shame or guilt varies dramatically 5R--but (perhaps
surprisingly) the influence is present even with the most
evolutionarily basic emotions. 59 "Not only ideas, but feelings, too, are
cultural artifacts." 60 Thus, despite evidence of some universal aspects
of emotion and its expression across culture, gender, race, and other
dividing lines, 61 in "humans, the potential for complexity is as
universal as anything." 62 When emotional common sense is used to
shape law, then, there is a danger that cultural biases will be enacted
63
or relevant emotional diversity ignored.
Emotional common sense, having been shaped by culture, also
reflects it, embodying the "webs of meaning" that constitute and
57.

GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 80; see also Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up

Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 217, 219-22 (Susan A.

Bandes ed., 1999) [hereinafter THE PASSIONS OF LAW] (describing cultural "scripting" of
emotions).
58. Scherer, supra note 50, at 175 (concluding that although "some basic eliciting themes
are very similar," especially for simple emotions like disgust, anger, sadness, and fear, once
"norms, values, and cultural practices become important, especially for complex emotions such as
shame and guilt, the eliciting situations and their meaning become vastly more complicated and
culture will obviously play a much bigger role").
59. Research shows, for example, that white and black American subjects show persistent,
precognitive, physiological fear reactions toward other-race but not same-race persons, even
when reporting no conscious feelings of bias. The most plausible evolutionary interpretation is
that pairing a cognitive "dissimilar other" judgment with "fear" was evolutionarily adaptive.
However, culture provides the specific content of the "dissimilar other" judgment-in this
instance, race. See Terry A. Maroney, Comment: UnlearningFear of Outgroup Others, 72 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing Andreas Olsson et al., The Role of Social

Groups in the Persistence of Learned Fear, 309 Sci. 785 (2005), and Arne Ohman, Conditioned
Fear of a Face:A Prelude to Ethnic Enmity?, 309 SCI. 711 (2005)).
60. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 81; see also Calhoun, supra note 57, at 22021 (considering social constructionist theories of emotions and assessing "their emphasis on the
scripting of emotions"). For a harmonization of innate and culturally constructed theories of
emotion, see P.N. Johnson-Laird & Keith Oatley, Cognitive and Social Construction in Emotions,
in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS 458, 458-75 (Michael Lewis & Jeannette M. Haviland-Jones eds., 2d
ed. 2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS].
61. See, e.g., LAZARUS, supra note 45, at 71-74 (claiming that "facial expressions are part of
our hereditary endowment" and may be the most universal aspect of emotion, though diversity
remains); Dacher Keltner & Paul Ekman, Facial Expression of Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS, supra note 60, at 236, 239, 241-42 (noting that some studies have indicated that
"across cultures, people judge facial expressions of emotion with levels of accuracy that exceed
chance," though cultural variations remain significant).
62. Ellsworth, supra note 52, at 151.
63. Thompson, supra note 6, at 119:
[T]he use of common sense, is an inevitable, yet potentially dangerous feature of
judicial behavior [because] legal decisions based on common sense understandings of
persons and behaviors can hide judicial biases by cloaking them in a dominant (and
homogenous) view of human agency and responsibility that may be inappropriate in a
highly diverse society.
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bound a cultural grouping. 64 By closely interpreting common-sense
ideas, we may identify a group's worldview, its members' "picture of
the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self,
of society," 65 the "imaginative world" within which they live. 66 By
examining situations in which people report sadness, for example, we
can infer their valuation of the person or thing that has been lost.
Emotional common sense thus conveys meaning, even if not probative
of external truths in the world. 67 Where emotional common sense is
operative in law, then, it will enact the belief structures and values of
those invoking it. While these expressions of worldviews may at times
be appropriate, at other times they may ignore the equally legitimate
worldviews of others.
Finally, the most troubling aspect of common sense
epistemologically is its extraordinary inconsistency, not just between
cultures but within individual subjects. Directly opposing folk beliefs
may be held simultaneously and will be selectively invoked "to justify
what we already do or believe" and "to suit our current values and
ideals." 68 When people believe, for example, both that "haste makes
waste" and that "he who hesitates is lost," it is not possible to say one
is right and the other is not. Rather, which is presented as true in a
given instance signals the subject's evaluation that the particular

64. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 5-6. To be sure, there are some "basicepistemic" common-sense ideas that will be widely shared across cultural and temporal dividesfor example, the notion that we have bodies and that a physical world outside our bodies exists.
See Herman Parret, Common Sense: From Certainty to Happiness, in COMMON SENSE, supra
note 5, at 17, 21-22 (explaining that basic-epistemic ideas are propositions so likely to be true
(such as the claim "I exist") that the "likelihood of their 'truth' cannot and need not be increased
by additional evidence"). Some emotional common sense might fit this category. See infra Part
III.
65. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 127.
66. Ortner, supra note 56, at 9-10; see also Kelley, supra note 45, at 16 ("To the degree that
common beliefs reflect accurately observed and encoded experience, [they can serve as]
information about reality."); David R. Olson, Schooling and the Transformation of Common
Sense, in COMMON SENSE, supra note 5, at 319, 332 (arguing that common sense "offers a picture
of reality, a world view," and will vary considerably as "not all humans live in the same social
world"); Geoffrey M. White, Representing Emotional Meaning: Category, Metaphor, Schema,
Discourse, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 60, at 30, 30-44 (explaining the role of
language in interpreting cross-cultural emotions and emotional meanings).
67. W. Gerrod Parrott, The Heart and the Head: Everyday Conceptions of Being Emotional,
in EVERYDAY CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PSYCHOLOGY,
ANTHROPOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS OF EMOTION 73, 80 (J.A. Russell et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter
EVERYDAY CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION] (noting that although it is not always helpful for
discerning "what actually occurs during emotional episodes," self-report is "quite appropriate for
inferring the folk conception of those episodes").
68. Epstein, supra note 29, at 48.
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situation is best handled by slowing down or speeding up. 69 Thus,
common sense often will bear no relation to "truth" in an absolute
sense but instead will signal a person's appraisal of the specific
attributes of a situation as it relates to her own beliefs, goals, and
values.
Common sense, then, including emotional common sense, may
be seen to contain a wisdom of its own. Sometimes it ought to be
respected as a useful synthesis of collective observation about the
domain with which humans are most familiar: our everyday emotional
lives. It also may be systematically inaccurate, especially insofar as it
purports to understand the deepest workings of our own minds or the
experiences of unfamiliar others. It necessarily will be rough-andready, responding in a generally acceptable way to the immediate
needs of everyday life, 70 and will be ad hoc, admitting of significant
inconsistencies, none of which will appear particularly bothersome to
the holder. 71 Most fundamentally, common-sense views will provide a
window into beliefs, self-perception, and values.
These many attributes of common sense pose particular
challenges for law. Some have suggested that common sense
permeates law because it is well suited to it; both are eminently
practical, concerned with "application of the rules of justice and
honesty to the things of this work-a-day world, so full of anomalies
and of fallible, imperfect, human beings." 72 Others-particularly
psychologists-have instead urged that law purge itself of its
misguided reliance on things commonsensical in favor of studied
empiricism. 73 Yet other scholars have reached for a middle approach

69. Olson, supra note 66, at 331 (noting that commonsense beliefs expressed in proverbs
"are not just 'truths' but ... social-controlling devices, admonitions to act in a certain way").
70. Id. ("If [commonsense beliefs] are to be practically useful, as well as to help uphold and
reinforce a social world, as well as to correctly represent events, they will not do any of these
things especially well. They will rather do all [of these] things reasonably well.").
71. See Van Zandt, supra note 10, at 929 (arguing that individuals are concerned not with
overall coherence but with "pragmatic employability").
72. Riddell, supra note 7, at 995. Indeed, Riddell went so far as to claim that the controlling
common law of his time was the embodiment of common sense. Id. ("[T]he common law is the
perfection of human reason ...common law is common sense."); see also Allen, supra note 11, at
1426 ("For all the jokes about the law being an ass, in fact it is the embodiment of common sense,
as it would have to be. ...[And] if [the law] were not generated largely from and consistent with
the conventional interactions of individuals, it would not survive."). But see Van Zandt, supra
note 10, at 936 (arguing that if law were simply common sense, "the coercive force of law would
seem to be superfluous").
73. See, e.g., Meehl, supranote 33, at 68 (recounting views of academic psychologists).
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in which common sense will sometimes have a proper place in law and
74
sometimes-perhaps more often-not.
This Article seeks just such a middle path. The following Part
will demonstrate how the above attributes of emotional common sense
are operative within constitutional law: sometimes the Court's
suppositions are right, sometimes they are not, they generally are
used instrumentally, and they always are imbued with greater
meaning than is immediately apparent. Having then a much richer
understanding of the phenomenon, Part III returns to the task of
delineating the merits of emotional common sense within
constitutional law.

II. EMOTIONAL COMMON SENSE AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
THICK DESCRIPTION

Despite the complexity revealed by the preceding Part, one
attribute that characterizes common sense is that it everywhere and
always retains "the maddening air of simple wisdom with which it is
uttered. '75 Reaching beneath that misleading simplicity, this Part
provides a thick description of how emotional common sense operates
76
within constitutional law.

74. See, e.g., id. at 92 (bemoaning the lack of a "touchstone as to pragmatic validity, some
quick and easy objective basis for deciding" when common sense is useful in law).
75. GEERTZ, LOcAL KNOWLEDGE, supranote 32, at 85.
76. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 3, 6-10 (describing a "thick description"
approach as one that attempts to incorporate an understanding of the context and implications of
an account in order to obtain a meaningful understanding); see also Ortner, supra note 56, at 4
(noting that this interpretive approach once was seen as "terribly soft" but now is highly valued).
Ferreting out places in which law relies on emotional common sense is no simple task. See
Meehl, supra note 33, at 93 (explaining that "[a] taxonomy of fireside inductions.., might
permit a rough ordering ... as to accuracy," but the task is "monstrous and thankless"); Richard
A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1049, 1065 (2006)
(explaining that "[t]he role of emotion and intuition as important but inarticulable grounds of a
judicial decision is concealed by the convention that requires a judge to explain his decision in an
opinion" because a judge would be criticized for explaining his decision "in terms of an emotion or
a hunch"). The thickly descriptive approach of this Article therefore does not pretend to cover the
entire field of emotional common sense within constitutional law as construed by the Supreme
Court. This interpretive methodology is well-suited to exploration of a new concept, as it
encourages selection of enough stories to identify a trend and a deep exploration of those stories.
The insights thus gleaned may then be moved outward to the rest of the domain. The many other
sorts of common sense operative in law, less obviously relating to emotion, also merit such an
exploration. Cf. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 611 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority's "support-free assumption" that "civil liability is an effective deterrent"); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) ("Common sense... will enable courts
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same
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The Supreme Court's use of emotional common sense in
construing constitutional law reflects each of the core attributes of
common sense. First, it is intermittently accurate. As revealed
through examination of cases involving, first, free speech and, second,
the instruction of capital sentencing jurors, at times the Court's folk
wisdom is reasonably sound; at other times it is just wrong.7 7 There is
no obvious predictability in the Court's accuracy, nor is there a
transparent theory from which hidden consistency might be discerned.
Where emotional common sense provides a distorted account of the
world, those distortions should not be embedded in law. However,
there is a weightier point: though a sound empirical grounding is
necessary to proper invocation of emotional common sense, it is not
sufficient. Being contextual and parochial, many of its tenets are true
for some people in some circumstances but not others. In those
instances, "truth" has little to do with it.78 Examination of cases
drawn from the Court's abortion jurisprudence shows that in such
instances emotional common sense is used instrumentally to further
normative goals and values, revealing a Justice's affiliations and
beliefs-affiliations and beliefs often not generalizable to third parties.
A. The Intermittent Accuracy of Emotional Common Sense
As the previous Part suggests, one metric by which emotional
common sense may be judged is its truth value. If it sometimes
embodies stable conclusions of distilled wisdom, the Court's invocation
of it sometimes should reflect a largely accurate view of the way the
world works; and, in fact, this is so.
The Vietnam War-era case of Cohen v. California79 provides
one example. Cohen had been arrested in 1968 for wearing, in a
courthouse, a jacket on which the words "Fuck the Draft" appeared. 80
sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile
or abusive,").
77. Though this Article refers to "the Court" as a unitary entity, the invocation of emotional
common sense is something done by individual Justices. Where this Article refers to "the Court,"
it is referring to the author of (and, to a lesser degree, the signatories to) the majority opinion
being discussed.
78. That is, the Court never should invoke a common sense notion that is never true for the
affected persons under the circumstances about which the law is concerned. What to do when the
common sense notion may be true for some people, but only sometimes, is a different issue. See
infra Part II.B; see also Posner, supra note 76, at 1053 (arguing that within a "zone of
reasonableness" in constitutional cases, "a decision cannot be labeled 'right' or 'wrong'; truth just
is not in the picture").
79. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
80. Cohen was charged under a section of the California Penal Code sanctioning disorderly
conduct, including disturbing the peace or using "vulgar, profane, or indecent language within
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The Court recognized that the government could not sanction the
"underlying message" in opposition to the draft; rather, the arrest
must have related to the manner in which that message was
conveyed-by use of a vulgar word.8 1 That manner of communication,
the Court held, was protected by the First Amendment, for "much
linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function. 8' 2 In
reaching this conclusion it relied heavily on the idea that particular
words convey not only ideas,
but otherwise inexpressible emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for
their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the
Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech[,] has little or
no regard for that emotive function which[,] practically speaking, may often be the more
important element of the overall message sought to be communicated.83

Cohen had testified that his choice of words was designed
precisely to "inform[] the public of the depth of his feelings against the
Vietnam War and the draft. '8 4 The Court agreed, finding that the
word "fuck" necessarily conveyed that emotional message and could
not be regulated "without effectively repressing Cohen's ability to
8 5
express himself."
The Cohen majority simply invoked its own views about the
relationship between emotion and speech, reflecting an implicit
judgment that the emotional attributes of speech are so obvious that
they need no explanation. Unpacking its assumptions, the Court
appears to have believed that some words or language patterns are
more emotionally salient than others, that such emotional speech
conveys information, and that such speech conveys different
information than does less emotionally salient speech. The Court
turns out to have been on empirically solid ground. Each of these
assertions is well supported in the academic literature in addition to
being commonly believed to be true. Particular word choices can

the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud or boisterous manner." See id. at 16 n. 1
(citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1974)).
81. Id. at 18-19. For an analysis of the cultural taboos associated with the word "fuck" and
how they played into the Court's decision in Cohen, see Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28
CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1731-37 (2007).
82. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 16; see also Brief for Appellant at 33, Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (No. 70-299) ("The very
fact that the Appellant chose to express his feelings about the draft through the use of a word
that many would find shocking is an evidence of a depth of feeling which itself may be a
significant factor as to which the self-governing community should take account." (citation
omitted)).
85. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18.
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distinctively convey specific emotions,8 6 as well as the depth and
intensity of emotions; emotional messages do have a distinctive feel
and sound.8 7 From these essentially sound ideas about emotional
communication the Court proceeded to a normative legal rule: the
Constitution protects the emotional message and its "crude" packaging
to the same extent as the cognitive message and its more "rational"
packaging.8 8 The legal move hardly follows inevitably, though the
Court acted as if it must.8 9 But disagreements with this move and
with the normative rule directly should not be based on any argued
illegitimacy of the Cohen Court's emotional common sense.
In contrast, the jurisprudence of so-called "anti-sympathy
instructions" in death penalty cases provides an example of how the
empirical underpinnings of the Court's emotional assumptions can be
off-base. In upholding such instructions, the Court invokes common
myths about the relationship between emotion, reason, and moral
decisionmaking.
86. There is a large body of research on the affective components of language. For one
primary tool used to identify such components, see M.M. BRADLEY & P.J. LANG, CTR. FOR RES. IN
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY, UNIV. OF FLA., AFFECTIVE NORMS FOR ENGLISH WORDS ("ANEW"): STIMULI,
INSTRUCTION MANUAL AND AFFECTIVE RATINGS, TECHNICAL REPORT C-1 (1999).
87. See Zoltdn K~vecses, Introduction: Language and Emotion Concepts, in EVERYDAY
CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION, supra note 67, at 3, 3-4 ("Examples include shit! when angry, wow!
when enthusiastic or impressed, yuk! when disgusted, and many more ....[Choice of language
also] denote[s] aspects of emotion concepts, such as intensity, cause, control, etc."); Steven
Pinker, What the F***? Why We Curse, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 8, 2007, at 24, 24-29 (discussing
"the strange emotional power of swearing"). That emotional language will be distinct is true
across cultures, though the manner in which such speech will be distinct will vary dramatically.
See, e.g., D.L. Brenneis, "Caught in the Web of Words" Performing Theory in a Fiji Indian
Community, in EVERYDAY CONCEPTIONS OF EMOTION, supra note 67, at 241, 242-47 (examining
the effect of language and arguments on listeners in Bhatgaon); Tom Johnstone & Klaus R.
Scherer, Vocal Communication of Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 60, at 220,
223 (comparing short term changes in fundamental frequency in tonal languages and in IndoEuropean languages).
88. This aspect of Cohen is not always followed where speech occurs in restricted
environments. The Eleventh Circuit recently upheld the suspension of high school students who
had displayed the Confederate battle flag, offering an emotional-content argument that, under
Cohen, should have weighed in favor of allowing the speech. See Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua
County, 324 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("[The confederate flag issue is] highly
emotionally charged ... [and] is not merely an intellectual discourse. Real feelings-strong
feelings-are involved. It is not only constitutionally allowable for school officials to closely
contour the range of expression children are permitted regarding such volatile issues, it is their
duty to do so.").
89. There is an important distinction between showing that the Court's emotional common
sense is correct (or incorrect) and arguing that the outcome of the case is correct (or incorrect). If
the emotional common sense is incorrect but bears no discernable relation to outcome, it is
unfortunate but harmless; if it is correct, the Court could nonetheless arrive at a normatively
"wrong" outcome for entirely different reasons. But where the emotional common sense is
empirically flawed and does influence the outcome, the outcome is to that extent wrong, though
perhaps otherwise justifiable.
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Since the reinstatement of the death penalty90 it has become
"talismanic"9 1 for the Court to insist that imposition of the death
sentence must "be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice and emotion." 92 Though the effort to banish "emotion" was
motivated in significant part by a desired move away from the racial
bias that pervaded the capital system,9 3 the horse has long left that
barn; the Court now speaks in much more general terms about the
supposed perils of emotion. In two important cases, California v.
Brown and Saffle v. Parks, it has approved "anti-sympathy"
instructions in which capital sentencing juries are admonished to set
aside all "passion" and "sentiment," including emotions ranging from
"prejudice" to "sympathy."94 Such instructions are considered
justifiable-perhaps even required-because of the Court's evaluation
that a capital sentencing jury's decision must be a "reasoned moral
response" rather than "an emotional one." 95 In drawing this key
90. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 218-20 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding death
penalty statutes that provided procedural safeguards to ensure that juries are adequately
restrained from arbitrarily imposing the death penalty).
91. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977).
93. Post-Furman cases stressed the need for a "rational" and "fair" system for capital
punishment that would prevent the influence of racial biases and channel-and presumably
tame-public outcry against particularly "unsympathetic" defendants. See, e.g., Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479-84 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining that concern about
racial discrimination played a significant role in the development of modern capital sentencing
jurisprudence); id. at 500-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that neither the race of the
defendant, nor the race of the victim, should play a part in any decision to impose a death
sentence). Anti-sympathy instructions have been upheld by reliance on the "rationalizing"
language of those cases. See, e.g., Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493 (upholding the use of anti-sympathy
instructions based on prior cases, which emphasized that imposition of the death penalty should
not be an emotional response to the mitigating evidence).
94. The instruction approved in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987), was as
follows:
You must not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
public opinion or public feeling. Both the People and the defendant [have a] right to
expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the
law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the
consequences of such verdict may be.
See Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 30, Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (No. 85-1563) (quoting trial
transcript). Brown objected that this instruction barred jurors from considering and giving effect
to his mitigating evidence. In Saffle, the Court approved a similar instruction lacking the
qualifier "mere" and suggested the instruction might be constitutionally required. 494 U.S. at
493.
95. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493. The Saffle prosecutor had argued to the jury that it must eschew
all emotional influence. Id. at 511 (describing the prosecutor urging the jurors to be "coldblooded," reminding them they had promised at voir dire not to be moved by sympathy, and
urging that: "[I]t's just cold turkey. He either did it or he didn't. He either deserves the death
penalty or he doesn't, you know. You leave the sympathy, and the sentiment and prejudice part
out of it."). Similar arguments had been made to the jury in Brown; the prosecutor argued that
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distinction, the Court has asserted that "[w]hether a juror feels
sympathy for a capital defendant is more likely to depend on that
juror's own emotions than on the actual evidence regarding the crime
and the defendant." 96 Because emotions are, in the Court's view, akin
to "whim" and "caprice," they allow "the fate of a defendant to turn on
the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities." 97 Banishing
emotion thus furthers fairness and accuracy because sentencing will
turn not on the arbitrary factor of "whether the defendant can strike
an emotional chord in a juror" but, rather, on a reasoned judgment of
98
moral desert.
Two factual inaccuracies underlie and significantly influence
Brown and Saffle. 99 First, the Court's assumption as to the necessarily
irrational and fleeting nature of emotion is incorrect. Second, emotions
and moral decisionmaking are unavoidably intertwined, and it is
highly misleading to draw such a critical distinction between the two.
These twin errors are assumed, not defended. 10 0
the defense's proffer of mitigating evidence was a "blatant attempt to inject personal feelings in
the case" and that jurors were required by law to "steel [them]selves against those kinds of
feelings." 479 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting trial transcript); see also People v.
Brown, 756 P.2d 204, 209 & n.3 (Cal. 1988) (describing the prosecutor's argument that the
penalty decision was "not a vote from the heart, and cannot be one"); Brief for Respondent at
app. A, Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (No. 85-1563) (collecting similar arguments in other proceedings).
96. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 493.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 495.
99. For examples of scholarly articles that have explored other complex issues attending
anti-sympathy instructions in capital cases beyond the scope of this Article, see Susan A.
Bandes, The Heart Has Its Reasons: Examining the Strange Persistence of the American Death
Penalty, 42 STUD. L. POL. & SOC'Y 1 (2008); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing
the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 702-04 (1989) (discussing the
risks of anti-sympathy instructions and proposing a jury instruction that recognizes the role of
emotion). Moreover, use of similar instructions in the guilt phase of criminal cases (including
capital ones) and in civil cases raises distinct issues not addressed here. See, e.g., People v.
Banhauer, 463 P.2d 408, 414 (Cal. 1970) (approving use at guilt phase); Neal R. Feigenson,
Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 13 (1997)
(discussing anti-sympathy instructions in civil cases).
100. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting that cases have not
defined the distinction). This sort of emotional common sense is a slightly different iteration than
that invoked in Cohen; it reflects a sort that might be called "received wisdom," concepts that
perhaps have been closely considered and debated but now are regarded as so obviously settled
as to have become commonsensical. See, e.g., Free Online Dictionary, http://www.
thefreedictionary.comreceived (defining "received" as having been "generally accepted as true or
worthy") (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). It is, of course, difficult to pinpoint precise language
necessarily signifying an assertion of common sense. While sometimes the Court uses terms like
"common sense," "self-evident," 'hardly can be denied," and the like, common sense often is also
characterized by the simple assertion that certain things are just true. In the anti-sympathy
instructions jurisprudence the Justices generally take the latter course, though they do
sometimes nod in the direction of drawing on common sense. See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538, 543 (1987) (explaining that the instruction guards against "extraneous emotional
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The first assumption is particularly entrenched. One of the
most common folk beliefs about emotion is that it is sharply different
from rationality. 10 1 Though the law historically has embraced this
crude dichotomy, 0 2 in recent years it has been shown to be a false one,
adherence to which ignores the complex, nuanced relationship
between emotion and reason. 10 3 Indeed, evidence has mounted that
reasonably intact emotional faculties are necessary to the rational
judgment required by law.10 4 The Brown and Saffle Courts, however,
hewed to the model of emotions as irrational. This is an entirely
inaccurate description of emotions as a general phenomenon, because
they are a primary mechanism for understanding and responding to
our environment. The cognitive assessments of the world that drive
emotions-referred to as "appraisals"-often take place below
declarative consciousness (as do many cognitive mechanisms, for
example, those involved in vision and memory), but they are
environment-driven nonetheless. 0 5 As Judge Richard Posner has
noted, emotion "is a form of thought, though compressed and
inarticulate, because it is triggered by, and more often than not

factors which, we think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital defendant
than for him" (emphasis added)).
101. Nico H. Frijda et al., The Influence of Emotions on Beliefs, in EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS,
supra note 46, at 1, 2 (noting that this dichotomy is entrenched in "common-sense discourse");
Parrott, supra note 67, at 73-84 (noting that lay subjects' most common descriptors of emotion
center on being "irrational" and "out of control"); White, supra note 66, at 30 (explaining that the
cognitive/affective split is "deeply entrenched both in the English language and in common-sense
folk models of the mind").
102. Feigenson, supra note 99, at 15 (noting long legal tradition in which "emotional
decision-making is thought to be fundamentally irrational" and to "bias decision-makers");
Gewirtzman, supra note 24, at 632-45; Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed
Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 120 (2006). Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Brown, took note that the average juror "is likely to possess the common
understanding that law and emotion are antithetical, and an instruction that a wide range of
emotional factors are irrelevant to his or her deliberation reinforces that notion." 479 U.S. at 550
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. For an overview of such scholarship, see generally Maroney, supra note 102; see also
generallyTHE PASSIONS OF LAW, supra note 57 (examining the role of emotion in the practice and
conception of law and justice).
104. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Competence, "Rational Understanding,"and the
Criminal Defendant, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1375, 1400-08 (2006) (discussing the role of emotion
in decisionmaking).
105. An overview of the extensive literature on the cognitive basis of the emotions, a point in
no serious scientific dispute, goes beyond the scope of this Article. See generally THE NATURE OF
EMOTION, supra note 50, at 179-234 (collecting prominent scholars' explanations); PAULA M.
NIEDENTHAL ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY OF EMOTION: INTERPERSONAL, EXPERIENTIAL, AND COGNITIVE
APPROACHES 13-17 (2006) (examining cognitive appraisal theories); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19-79, 139-69 (2001) (exploring the
cognitive theory of emotion). See also infra Part II.B.2.
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produces rational responses to, information." 10 6 Juror emotions will be

anchored to information, such as the nature and circumstances of the
crime and attributes of the defendant. To the degree that certain
reactions, such as racial animus, may be normatively undesirable, the
problem stems not from their emotional nature but from their
objectionable cognitive content. The latter may be specifically
addressed, but not by a general prohibition on "passion" or
"sentiment."
Moreover, despite any common belief to the contrary, emotion
and the type of moral decisionmaking required of capital jurors are
deeply intertwined. This perspective has a long pedigree in
philosophy, 10 7 and many contemporary philosophers and scientists
have compiled impressive evidence of an innate connection between
emotion and moral judgment-including at the level of neural
function.108 The strongest claim is that emotions are both necessary
and sufficient for moral judgments, particularly judgments of a
personal nature, such as deciding whether to inflict harm on another
106. Posner, supra note 76, at 1063. To be sure, just as cognitive processes are prone to
systemic heuristics and biases, emotions too can be misguided or skewed in their account of the
world. See, e.g., Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS,
supra note 60, at 417, 427-30 (discussing several studies that addressed the use of heuristics as
opposed to systematic cognitive processing). But, as with cognition, the proper response to that
reality is to identify and (when possible) correct for the particular distortion, not to denigrate the
entire mechanism. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 104, at 1427 & nn.284-87 (arguing that just as
awareness of cognitive heuristics and biases does not denigrate cognition's contribution to
"rationality," the existence of emotional heuristics and biases does not prove that emotion is
inherently "irrational"). Similarly, the fact that certain basic emotions (such as fear) can
temporarily overwhelm conscious cognitive control of thought and action, and that profound
emotional disorder (such as depression) can do so in a more systemic and long-term manner, does
not provide a basis for labeling psychologically normal expression of emotion irrational. Id.
107. Hume argued that emotions precede the conscious "reasons" we construct to defend and
explain moral judgments. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (1739), reprinted in
WHAT Is AN EMOTION?, supra note 23, at 93-111; see also Barzun, supra note 44, at 1066
(discussing the intertwining of moral sense and emotion in Reid's Common-Sense philosophy).
This Article does not pretend to resolve intractable philosophical debates about the nature of
morals beyond asserting a non-negligible role for emotion in personally relevant moral
decisionmaking. See generally JESSE PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS (2007)
(providing an extended treatment of related debates).
108. See, e.g., MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: How NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL
SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 22-31 (2006) (discussing the work of philosopher David Hume and
developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman, both of which connected emotions to moral
judgment); Gewirtzman, supra note 24, at 663-68 (discussing research in social psychology and
neuroscience which supports the notion that emotion is indispensable to moral judgment); Jesse
Prinz, The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments, 9 PHIL. EXPLORATIONS 29, 30-33 (2006) (noting
evidence supporting a link between emotion and moral judgment); Joshua Greene, The Terrible,
Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality and What to Do About It 156-69 (Nov. 2002)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University), available at http://www.wjh.harvard
.edul-jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf (citing cases which suggest that moral
behavior depends crucially on emotion).
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human being. 10 9 The more parsimonious view is that emotions and
such moral judgments necessarily-or, even one step more
parsimoniously, usually--co-occur, but may not be causally related. 110
Taking even the most parsimonious view undermines the Brown and
Saffle Courts' position. That position wrongly depends on the emotionreason dichotomy, even though jurors are being asked whether to
approve the killing of an actual human being with whom they are in
direct, if mediated, contact. This is precisely the setting in which
emotion appears ubiquitous. 1 '
Thus, contemporary anti-sympathy instruction jurisprudence
may be called into question for relying on inaccurate suppositions
about emotion, reason, and moral judgment. Such instructions might
112
be otherwise justified, but not on the basis of those assumptions.
From these cases we see that the Court sometimes is called on
to make constitutionally relevant judgments by describing and
evaluating the emotions of other persons. In Cohen, it is the speaker
(and, to a lesser degree, his audience); in the anti-sympathy

109. Joshua Greene et al., An JMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105, 2105-07 (2001); see also Joshua Greene's Homepage, http://www.
wjh.harvard.edu/-jgreene/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (providing further details on Greene's
research).
110. Bandes, supra note 99, at 34 ("Although there is no unanimity about how moral
reasoning works," it is no longer controversial among those studying the role of emotion that
moral judgment is the product of both emotion and cognition.); Prinz, supra note 108, at 30
(asserting that the fact that "emotions co-occur with moral judgments... should not be terribly
controversial," as this comports with ordinary experience and "has been confirmed again and
again, in every study of what goes on in the brain during moral judgment").
111. Indeed, this is the view taken by the Brown and Saffle dissenters. They were prepared
to agree that the defendant is not entitled to "a sympathetic or emotional jury" and that the
decision should be a "moral" rather than an emotional one, though Justice Brennan appeared
unsure of the validity of the distinction. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that while the death-sentencing decision "might be a rational or moral
one, it also may arise from the defendant's appeal to the sentencer's sympathy or mercy, human
qualities that are undeniably emotional in nature"). But even assuming emotion is simply
concurrent with the moral judgment, the result is that "a juror who reacted sympathetically to
the evidence would have believed that he was not entitled to consider that evidence at all-not
even for its 'moral' weight." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 514 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 500 n.3 ("[The fact that the evidence is relevant to the jury's moral judgment
about the defendant's actions does not rule out the possibility that the evidence may also evoke
sympathy in the jurors."). Significantly, one year after Brown Justice Brennan wrote an
influential article urging greater respect for emotion in law. See Brennan, supra note 24, at 3
(arguing that "this interplay of forces, this internal dialogue of reason and passion, does not taint
the judicial process, but is in fact central to its vitality").
112. For efforts to revise anti-sympathy instructions in order to effectively distinguish
permissible and non-permissible emotional influences, and to encourage morally appropriate
emotional engagement, see Pillsbury, supra note 99, at 703-04; Georgia Sims, Functional or
Forbidden? Reevaluating the Role of Emotion in the Capital Jury 26-33 (May 2, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
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instructions context, it is the death-qualified juror (and, to a lesser
degree, the lawyers and judges). We see, too, that members of the
Court have little issue with simply asserting their own views.
Sometimes these views-emotional communication is importantly
distinctive-are in line with the weight of empirical evidence.
Sometimes such views-emotion is an irrational force that disrupts
moral decisionmaking-are against the weight of empirical evidence,
though they may be in line with widespread belief.
Taking stock at this point, we see that the Court's emotional
common sense is sometimes right, sometimes wrong. We would do well
to ask: So what? Many legal rules and interpretive approaches can be
used correctly or incorrectly, supported by sound factual assessments
or off-base ones. But there is something special about common sense
that makes it uniquely prone to such inconsistency, and that is its own
inconsistency. 113 As the following Section will show, the inherent
inconsistency of emotional common sense lends itself to
instrumentalism. Because such instrumentalism serves normative
goals that may be disguised under the cloak of "of-courseness," even
emotional common sense that is in some sense accurate-for some
people, some of the time-might not be a legitimate basis for crafting
legal rules.
B. The Meaning Structures of Emotional Common Sense
While the previous Section examined the Court's emotional
common sense by the metric of truth value, not all cases can be so
examined. In many instances different people naturally (and properly)
will regard different views as commonsensical, and in those instances
the proper focus is not on truth, but on meaning.11 4 As the Cohen
Court pointed out, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric,"1 1 5 and one
Justice's common sense is another's blatant implausibility. Indeed,
many dissents in these cases consist largely of attacking notions
presented as commonsensical by the majority. Perhaps such
disagreements reflect basic, consistent divides of opinion on the
specific types of facts at issue. More likely, though, they reflect the
instrumental use to which common sense, including emotional
common sense, is so prone.
113. See supra Part I (exploring the concept of "emotional common sense").
114. This distinction mirrors that between knowledge (judged by reference to truth value)
and belief (a psychological construct of meaning). See Frijda et al., supra note 101, at 4-5 ("In the
philosophical tradition belief is distinguished from knowledge by reference to the truth value and
claim to objectivity of knowledge.").
115. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).

878

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3:851

What does it mean, for example, to cry? In Weeks v.
Angelone, 116 Weeks argued that jury instructions improperly
suggested that jurors had a duty, rather than an option, to impose
death if the state proved a statutory aggravator. Calling it a "virtual
certainty" that the jury was thus misled, Justice Stevens in dissent
said the following:
The most significant aspect of the polling of the jury is a notation by the court reporter
that is unique. (At least I do not recall seeing a comparable notation in any of the
transcripts of capital sentencing proceedings that I have reviewed during the last 24plus years.) The transcript states that, as they were polled, "a majority of the jury
members [were] in tears." Given the unusually persuasive character of the mitigating
evidence... it is at least "reasonable" to infer that the conscientious jury members
under the law, notwithstanding a strong
performed what they regarded as their1 1duty
7
desire to spare the life of Lonnie Weeks.

Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, offered a sharp
rejoinder of that same transcript notation. It would be, he noted,
difficult to speculate about [the jurors'] emotions at the time they render a verdict. But if
we were to join in this speculation, it is every bit as plausible-if not more so-to think
that the reason that jurors were in tears was because they had just been through an
despite the
exhausting, soul-searching process that led to a conclusion that petitioner,
1 18
mitigating evidence he presented, still deserved the death sentence.

Here we see two different common-sense views about the
triggers for, function of, and information conveyed by crying. In the
first, crying is thought to be something people do when frustrated or
trapped-in this instance, by being forced to inflict a severe harm they
would prefer to avoid. Tears express perception of being in an
intolerable situation. In the second, crying is something people do
when exhausted and drained, as when they choose to inflict a severe
harm but are saddened by having to do so. Tears express depletion, as
well as recognition that correct choices are often bitterly hard ones.
Both propositions are plausible and well supported in the
importantly,
both
appear
literature. 119
More
academic
116. 528 U.S. 225 (2000) (death penalty case heard on habeas review).
117. Id. at 248-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 236 n.5.
119. See, e.g., Ad Vingerhoets & Lauren Bylsma, Crying as a Multifaceted Health Psychology
Conceptualisation:Crying as Coping, Risk Factor, and Symptom, 9 EUR. HEALTH PSYCHOLOGIST
68, 69, 73 (2007) ("[C]rying is much more than simply a symptom of a negative mood state; it is a
complex behavior ... [with] remarkable intra-and-inter-individual differences," and may be
triggered by "stressful situations" of many sorts.); see also TOM LUTZ, CRYING: THE NATURAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY OF TEARS 67-150 (1999) (exploring the physiology and psychology of crying).
In an interesting twist-judging not what crying means but how it affects others-a
prosecutor's office has sought to preclude defense attorneys from crying while delivering closing
arguments in the penalty phase of death penalty cases. See Sheila McLaughlin, No Crying in
Court: Butler's Piper Says Defense Lawyers' Tears Can Sway Jury, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June
20, 2008, at 1.
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commonsensical. It is hard to believe Justice Stevens would disavow
that sometimes people cry because they are exhausted, including by
having to make a hard decision. 'It is equally hard to believe that Chief
Justice Rehnquist would have denied that people may cry when they
feel unfairly trapped, including by being forced to inflict harm. 120 In
different circumstances, either Justice would regard the other's
assertion as eminently obvious. Which interpretation seems obvious in
a given instance has to do with the prior assessment as to the
attributes of that instance. Is this case one in which the death penalty
was appropriate, or is it not? What position does the Justice see
himself as occupying: The juror who desires to spare Weeks's life or
12 1
the one who does not?
The most cynical interpretation is that such instrumentalism is
strategic and deliberate: emotional common sense is a stalking horse
for precommitments, perhaps ideological ones. But that cynical view is
not necessary: it is more consistent with what is known about common
sense to presume that the Justices are sincere in expressing what
seems to them obvious in any given situation. So when we are in a
situation not of empirically correct or incorrect views but, rather, of
conflicting correct views-as with how the Weeks jurors' tears should
be interpreted-a Justice's assertions of emotional common sense are
120. Indeed, Rehnquist's language recognizes this possibility, as he regarded crying to be an
ambiguous emotional signal of which multiple interpretations are possible. His stance therefore
appeared to be that the Court should ignore it; however, his "handicapping" of its most likely
meaning itself signals where his common sense lay.
121. Such instrumentalism reaches down to the most fundamental assessments of emotion's
place in law. As Gewirtz has argued, "both conservative and liberal members of the Supreme
Court affirm that law is 'reason not emotion' only when it is convenient for them to do so."
Gewirtz, supra note 24, at 1029 & n.17. Justice O'Connor took a hard line against any influence
of emotion when construing anti-sympathy instructions, but subsequently endorsed victim
impact statements in precisely those same settings, despite their obvious emotional content.
Compare California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the
defendant's background, character, and crime rather than mere sympathy or emotion."), with
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 832 (1991) ("I do not doubt that jurors were moved by this
testimony-who would not have been?"). Justice Brennan, who argued strenuously against antisympathy instructions and separately urged greater respect for the role of emotion in law, joined
a majority opinion barring victim impact statements on the ground that they were too
"emotionally charged." Compare Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 513 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (challenging the distinction between "emotional" and "moral" responses, as sympathy
is "an important ingredient" in capital sentencing), with Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 50809 (1987) ("The admission of these emotionally charged opinions as to what conclusions the jury
should draw from the evidence clearly is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking we
require in capital cases."), overruled by Payne, 501 U.S. at 830. See also Susan A. Bandes,
Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 361, 377-83 (1996)
(describing the instrumental use of emotion by judges). Whether emotion is regarded as
antithetical to law's reason is not an absolute view; it is proffered as common sense when so
doing moves the Justice toward the desired outcome.
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best understood as indicators of her underlying normative
assessments, based on her worldview.
The following Subsections explore two manifestations of that
phenomenon. First, from a close examination of key abortion-protest
cases we see that a Justice's emotional common sense varies according
to the natural affiliation she displays with different types of people.
Emotional common sense therefore is worrisome insofar as it may
enact exclusionary affiliations. Second, turning once more to Carhart,
we see that the Court's emotional common sense silently reflects and
projects underlying beliefs and values. This, too, is worrisome insofar
as those beliefs and values may be highly contested and, at a
minimum, worthy of transparent articulation and justification.
1. I Feel You
One's worldview determines with whose emotional reality one
naturally will empathize. Those within our imaginative world are like
us; we "feel them."122 In cases concerning First Amendment
restrictions on anti-abortion protest, the Justices appear to inhabit
very different imaginative worlds indeed, and they therefore "feel"
different people. We see in these cases diametrically opposed ideas of
the operative emotional dynamic and a correlated difference in
judgment as to the degree to which such assessments may be given
legal weight. Not surprisingly, Justices believe that their views of
emotional dynamics are obvious and should be given weight, while
conflicting ones are not and should not. The divisions lie along two
general axes: the presumptive emotional impact of protest on abortion
providers and patients, and the presumptive emotional motivation
and communicative dynamic of the protestor.
Justices who write in favor of significant restrictions-such as
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens-see the predominant
tenor of targeted anti-abortion protest as one of anger, anxiety, and
fear. In Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., for example, a
Rehnquist majority easily accepted record evidence that patients were
required to run "a gauntlet" of protest to enter the clinics and that this
123
experience caused an unusual "level of anxiety and hypertension."'

122. See Urban Dictionary, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=I+feel+you
(last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (defining the slang term "I feel you"). For an introduction to debates
over the role of empathy and perspective-taking in law, one into which this Article dips but
briefly, see Bandes, supra note 121; Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1574 (1987).

123. 512 U.S. 753, 758 (1994). The Court has been asked numerous times to define
permissible limitations on protests near clinics and homes, settings in which the impact on

2009]

EMOTIONAL COMMON SENSE

881

Noting further that noise caused patients "stress"124 and that "patients
and relatives alike are often under emotional strain and worry," the
Court took their "psychological... well-being" into account in
restricting certain aspects of the protests. 125 Similarly, in Hill v.
Colorado, the Court took no issue with findings that "emotional
confrontations" associated with the protests were detrimental to
patients and "scary" to patients and providers. 126 In these and similar
cases, the Court cited evidence of violence and property damage to
support the view that the threat of physical harm lurks constantly
behind such protests.1 27 This perception of lurking threat then
underlay a legal judgment that non-trivial weight should be accorded
1 28
to the "emotional trauma" felt by patients and providers.
Other Justices, however-particularly Scalia and Kennedyhave taken quite the opposite view. In Madsen, Scalia sharply
disagreed that the protests were "set in a background of violence,"
except in a perhaps "episodic" or "isolated" way, and did not see them

patients and employees is considered relevant. The Court has taken an approach that could be
characterized as either careful or "Solomonic." Id. at 784-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part). It has allowed certain restrictions-for example, fixed
"buffer zones" around clinic entrances-and rejected others-for example, "floating buffer zones,"
invisible bubbles of space surrounding moving persons as they approach or exit entrances. Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 740-41 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,
519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997).
124. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 758.
125. For example, excessive noise and picketing directly in front of a provider's house were
curtailed, while showing visual images, picketing near a house, and approaching a patient in a
non-threatening way as she approaches a clinic were allowed. Id. at 768-76.
126. Hill, 530 U.S. at 710 & n.7.
127. In Madsen, for example, the Court noted that protestors had identified abortion
providers as "baby killers" in one-on-one contacts with their neighbors, and had confronted those
providers' children when they were home alone. For other cases involving more extensive
histories of violence and property damage, see Dianne Olivia Fischer, Comment, Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic: Women Under Siege, 47 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 1415, 1431 (1993).
In Madsen, the Court appeared to have relied on the cultural backdrop of such violence in other
instances in order to construe the reasonable fears of providers and patients. 512 U.S. at 784 n.7
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing record evidence that one doctor
had been followed by an "angry" protestor who pretended to shoot him, and that "a physician
similarly employed was killed by an anti-abortionist in North Florida'). Those aspects of the
cases dealing with direct threats, excessive noise at medical centers, and proximity to private
homes have been relatively uncontroversial. Hill, 530 U.S. at 752-53 & n.3 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 479, 48384 (1988)); Madsen, 512 U.S. at 810 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
128. Hill, 530 U.S. at 715 (noting government interest in avoiding "potential trauma to
patients associated with confrontational protests"); id. at 718 n.25; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768
("[T]argeted picketing of a hospital or clinic threatens not only the psychological, but also the
physical, well-being of the patient held 'captive' by medical circumstance." (citation omitted)).
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as creating an atmosphere of anxiety or fear. 129 Providing a detailed
account of his view of the events portrayed in a videotape of one
protest, 130 he described a diffuse and meandering event in which prochoice and anti-abortion activists trade chants and songs and wave
signs at one another; cars are briefly delayed while waiting for
activists of both stripes to get out of the way; and various people stroll
about, read books, and shout occasional religious messages and
graphic descriptions of abortion. 13 1 The emotional tenor of the protests
in this retelling is largely neutral, punctuated occasionally by
moments of harmless-if robust-expression from both sides of a
peaceful standoff.
This divergence in assessment of the operative emotional
dynamic is in even sharper relief in the context of restrictions on
"sidewalk counselors," people who approach individual women as they
walk toward clinic entrances and attempt to engage them in
conversation about why those women should not have an abortion. 132
The Hill majority noted that while the surrounding protests often had
included "emotional confrontations," the sidewalk counseling itself
had not been "abusive or confrontational."'1 33 Nonetheless, it relied in
significant part on the rationale of "avoidance of potential trauma,"
including "emotional harm," to patients in forbidding such counseling
within an eight-foot buffer zone surrounding each patient. 134 Justice
Stevens saw the sidewalk counselor's approach as necessarily creating
129. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 798-99 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (citing Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); Milk Wagon Drivers
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941)). Justice Scalia accused the majority of
ignoring the precedent of NAACP v. ClaiborneHardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which in his
view involved a far greater quantum of actual and threatened violence as a result of a racial
discrimination boycott, because Madsen concerned anti-abortion protest. Madsen, 512 U.S. at
800-01 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Hill, 530
U.S. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he jurisprudence of the Court has a way of changing when
abortion is involved.").
130. Justice Scalia's reliance on the videotape foreshadows the Court's later approach in a
Fourth Amendment case, in which the Justices relied nearly exclusively on their views of a
videotape of a car chase. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose
Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perilsof Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARv.
L. REV. 837 (2009). Compare Madsen, 512 U.S. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Anyone seriously
interested in what this case was about must view that tape."), with Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
379 n.5 (2007) (attaching videotape to online docket and stating "[w]e are happy to allow the
videotape to speak for itself').
131. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 788-90 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
132. Hill, 530 U.S. at 708, 721.
133. Id. at 710.
134. Id. at 715, 718 n.25; see also id. at 728-29 (stating that persons entering health care
facilities "are often in particularly vulnerable physical and emotional conditions" and are "under
special physical and emotional stress").
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fear of physical harassment; argued that women have the right to be
free from "importunity, following and dogging"; 135 and characterized
'136
those counselors as "hostile.
The view from the dissenters could not be more different. They
portrayed sidewalk counselors not as hostile, harassing "noodges" of
whom women would or should be afraid, but rather as sources of
succor. 13 7 Here we see the imaginative worlds of Justices Scalia and
Kennedy actively at work. In their respective Hill dissents each
provided an imagined monologue in which sidewalk counselors
express a message of compassion, care, and empathy. Thus, in Scalia's
constructed narrative a sidewalk counselor may hope
to forge, in the last moments before another of her sex is to have an abortion, a bond of
concern and intimacy that might enable her to persuade the woman to change her mind
and heart. The counselor may wish to walk alongside and say, sympathetically and as
softly as the circumstances will allow, something like: "My dear, I know what you are
going through. I've been through it myself. You're not alone and you do not have to do
this.... Will you let me help you? May I 'show
you a picture of what your child looks like
13 8
at this stage of her human development?"

Justice Kennedy imagined a similarly empathic atmosphere, perhaps
consisting of a gentle request to take a brochure and call a help line
"to talk with women who have been in your situation.' ' 39 He then
switched from the constructed voice of the sidewalk counselor to the
actual voice of a woman who chose not to abort after being given such
140
a brochure.
These competing narratives, with their competing emotional
tenors, reveal a fundamental difference in perspective-taking. 141 In

135. Id. at 717-18 (quoting Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184 (1921)).
136. Id. at 725 (explaining that a buffer zone would prevent approaches from both supporters
and opponents of abortion rights, but the latter would be perceived as "more hostile").
137. Id. at 743 n. 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that "Socrates may have been a noodge').
138. Id. at 757.
139. Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 790:
I was scared and all alone. I was too embarrassed to ask for help.... I ... [would
have] gone through with my abortion because the only people that were on my side
were the people at the abortion clinic. They knew exactly how I was feeling and what
to say to make it all better. In my heart, I knew abortion was wrong ....
In this narrative the abortion-clinic personnel are portrayed as compassionate, but their
emotional support is viewed negatively, as having encouraged an unwanted abortion. It is
therefore presented as a false compassion, as opposed to the true compassion of the anti-abortion
pamphlet provider.
141. There are, of course, other important iterations of selective perspective-taking in law;
this is one that has not previously been explored. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Eleventh
Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61, 92-93 (1996) (explaining that courts
"can only consider the case[s] before [them], not the broad story of dashed hopes and centuries-
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describing the protests, the Madsen and Hill majorities gravitate
instinctively to the perspective of the health care providers, whom
they imagine to be afraid of violence or vandalism; concerned for the
welfare of their patients; and beleaguered by attention, noise, and
confrontation. They also see themselves in the shoes of patients and
families, attempting to enter medical centers under stressful
conditions and seeking quiet and calm once inside. The dissenters put
themselves in different shoes. They imagine themselves as the pro-life
protestors, seeking to use "peaceful and civil means" to persuade
others of their "abiding moral or religious conviction" that "abortion is
the taking of a human life."'1 42 As Scalia's retelling of the videotape
suggests, it is as if the Justices-like the activists-are arrayed on
different sides of the street. Scalia's visual position on the antiabortion protestors' side allows him to see what he believes the
majority to be ignoring: pro-choice activists are also taking up space
and making noise. 143 This perspective-switching is also evident with
regard to sidewalk counselors. Stevens's narrative of harassment is
told from the perspective of a patient seeking an abortion from which
she does not want to be dissuaded, into whose space the counselor
moves; Scalia and Kennedy position themselves as the counselors,
even to the extent of providing accounts of their motivations, goals,
and voices. Justice Kennedy also urges identification with a different
kind of patient: one who does wish to be dissuaded from abortion.
From these different vantage points the Justices perceive vastly
different emotional dynamics. 144
long mistreatment that afflicts an entire people and forms the historical and cultural background
of [the] complaint"); Alan Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw from 1954 to 1989: Uncertainty,
Contradiction,Rationalization, Denial, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 285,

286-89 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) (comparing the "victim" perspective and the "perpetrator"
perspective); Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1395 (1991) (describing the
"concept of positioned perspective, developed by feminists and critical race theorists").
142. Hill, 530 U.S. at 763 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 810 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that anti-abortion protestors will be muzzled
while pro-choice ones "can continue to shout their chants at their opponents exiled across the
street to their heart's content").
144. In these and other cases, Justices Kennedy and Scalia project a strong cultural
affiliation with the pro-life movement, which is in many important respects a subculture. For an
example of how the movement self-identifies as a "culture," see Culture of Life USA,
http://www.cultureoflifeusa.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (describing Culture of Life USA's
mission and identity). The Justices in the Hill and Madsen majorities do not, though, necessarily
affiliate with some definable opposing cultural group, such as the organized pro-choice
movement; it suffices that they simply do not affiliate with the pro-life one. One important
function of cultural affiliation is to identify insiders and outsiders; the group of outsiders
necessarily encompasses all who are not within the cultural imaginative world, regardless of
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This default emotional vantage point functions similarly to the
"cultural cognition effect" demonstrated by Dan Kahan and his
collaborators. 14 5 First, Justices demonstrate a greater willingness to
accept record evidence when it conforms to their emotional
commitments and to challenge it when it does not. 146 In Madsen, for
example, Scalia accused the majority of taking factual findings below
"on faith," impliedly because those findings-about, for example, the
extent of patients' fear-accorded with their own implicit judgments.
Second, we see "overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of the
factual perceptions we hold in common with our confederates and
unwarranted contempt for the perceptions associated with our
opposites." 147 This flows in both directions: one often cannot see one's
own common-sense assumptions, but those of others may seem
preposterous. In Hill, for example, Kennedy criticized, as based on an
unwarranted "supposition" about the nature of sidewalk counseling,
the majority's view that it was protecting women from being
"embarrassed, vexed, or harassed as they attempt to enter abortion
clinics."1 48 Scalia ridiculed any assumption that sidewalk counseling
raises a specter of harassment, derisively citing "the 'physically
harassing' act of (shudder!) approaching within closer than eight
feet." 149 Those Justices, though, then did precisely the same: they cited
those aspects of the record that most accorded with their views about
the emotional dynamics of anti-abortion protest and invoked their
vision of what likely takes place during sidewalk counseling, literally
providing the narrative themselves. 150
what other worlds they may inhabit. See Olson, supra note 66, at 321-22 (explaining that a
group's common-sense beliefs separate "insiders" from "outsiders"). Outsider status-the fact
that these other Justices fail to share the cultural identification-affects their motivation and
ability to perceive what those within the group perceive.
145. Kahan et al., supranote 130, at 842 ("[P]erceptions of fact are pervasively shaped by our
commitments to shared but contested views of individual virtue and social justice."); Posner,
supra note 76, at 1065 (endorsing cultural cognition theory).
146. Kahan, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing, inter alia, "identity-protective cognition," the
"white male effect," "biased assimilation," and "group polarization"). Indeed, emotion scholars
have proposed that emotional connection with a particular view of events serves similar
functions. See Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 11 (asserting that strong emotions provide an
"intensity funnel" and "narrow attention to object-relevant information and emotion-relevant
goals").
147. Kahan et al., supra note 130, at 842-43 ("[A]lthough our ability to perceive this type of
value-motivated cognition in others is quite acute, our power to perceive it in ourselves tends to
be quite poor.").
148. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 777-78 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 762 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. What Kahan and his collaborators describe as "cognitive illiberalism," then, has a close
relative: emotional illiberalism. The emotional aspect of factual perception and interpretation is
equally susceptible to such illiberalism, recourse to which crosses ideological divides. See Kahan
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The emotional vantage point does not influence only the
perception of constitutionally relevant facts; it also influences legal
judgment directly. Scalia and Kennedy, while acknowledging that
women may feel "annoyed" or even "deeply upset" when approached by
a sidewalk counselor, doubt that such feelings will often-if ever-rise
to such a level as to warrant legal weight. 151 Indeed, Scalia has urged
152
abandonment of the "emotional upset" justification altogether.
Perhaps
most
interestingly,
Scalia
and
Kennedy's
predisposition to imagine the voice of the compassionate sidewalk
counselor alerted them to a legal issue the majority appears not to
have considered-the protection due, under Cohen, to the unique
emotional content of speech. 153 Characterizing as "absurd" the Hill
majority's assessment that an eight-foot buffer zone left open
adequate alternatives for communication, Scalia argued that one
cannot converse normally across that distance, implying that the
attributes of "normal conversation" are somehow essential to the
message. 154 "The availability of a powerful amplification system will
be of little help to" the kind, soft-spoken counselor Scalia
envisioned.155 Her message, he argued, requires quiet, intimate
conversation, but the "Court would have us believe that this can be
done effectively-yea, perhaps even more effectively-by shouting
through a bullhorn at a distance of eight feet."' 56 Kennedy echoed this
view, disputing that "these grave moral matters can be discussed just
as well through a bullhorn" as "through peaceful face-to-face
communication."'' 57 Though apparently not recognizing the connection
et al., supra note 130, at 843 (asserting that judges should always be alert to the influence of
"cognitive illiberalism" and should take the precautions necessary to minimize it).
151. Hill, 530 U.S. at 747-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also argues that the inevitable
emotional upset depends on the content of the speech, which may not be regulated. Id. (arguing
that Colorado had impermissibly restricted sidewalk counselors and not other protestors out of
an "apparent belief that only speech with this content is sufficiently likely to be annoying or
upsetting as to require consent before it may be engaged in at close range").
152. See Williams v. Planned Parenthood of Shasta-Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133, 1135-36
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the emotional upset rationale was "entirely snuffed
by" Madsen and Schenck). The Schenck Court had declined to decide whether patients' "wellbeing' was implicated. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 n.8 (1997).
However, the Court's denial of certiorari in Williams, leaving untouched the California Supreme
Court's possible construal of emotional upset as one manner in which protestors can deny clinic
access, 520 U.S. at 1135 (Scalia, J., dissenting), left the status of that rationale unclear. The
rationale was subsequently reiterated in Hill, 530 U.S. at 709-10.
153. See supra Part II.A.
154. Hill, 530 U.S. at 756 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 757.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 789, 790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Without the ability to interact in person,
however momentarily, with a clinic patron near the very place where a woman might elect to
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to Cohen, the dissenters asserted that the emotional content of the
counselor's message was as important as the cognitive one.
In important respects the dissenters are correct. An eight-foot
buffer likely impairs communication of one possible emotional aspect
of a sidewalk counselor's message: compassion, which by its nature is
best communicated softly and at close range.1 58 Though one aspect of
the content-"do not have an abortion, it is a grave moral harm"easily can be conveyed from a distance and at high volume, another
aspect-"I understand and care deeply about you as a person"arguably cannot. 15 9 To this extent, the dissenters have isolated a legal
issue that is missed if one were to take a different intuitive approach.
After all, if one does not imagine it possible or likely that honest
compassion and empathy would be communicated, why consider
constructing a rule around that possibility? If one imagines the
emotional motivation and impact of the counselor more aggressively,
the buffer zone would not appear to impair the emotional content at
all; anger and hostility can be expressed through a bullhorn, and they
may in fact be better expressed through a bullhorn.160 Under the sound
approach of Cohen, though, the dissenters' argument merits at least
transparent consideration. To be sure, the move from emotional
judgment to legal norm ought not be regarded as preordained; the
proper balance of rights would still be contested, and such
contestation might result in the same outcome.' 6' But whether the
receive an abortion, the statute strips petitioners of using speech in the time, place, and manner
most vital to the protected expression."); see also id. at 791 ("[The Court] in effect tells us the
moral debate [recognized in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey] is not so
important after all and can be conducted just as well through a bullhorn from an 8-foot distance
as it can through a peaceful, face-to-face exchange of a leaflet.").
158. See, e.g., Johnstone & Scherer, supranote 87, at 220-35 (noting that different emotional
states strongly affect the frequency, volume, speed, and other components of speech and that
"given the high recognition of emotions in speech, there must exist emotion-specific acoustic
patterns"). It is possible to communicate compassion impersonally and from a long distancesuch as in a billboard expressing sorrow for and solidarity with victims of a terrorist attack-but
that sort of message is less immediate, urgent, and personal than a face-to-face communication
between individuals.
159. Id. at 223 (asserting that "over distances the voice is not a particularly private medium"
and is "more suitable for the signaling of certain emotions," such as "fear and alarm," while other
emotions are best communicated at close range); see id. at 222 (stating that "rage" causes
distinctive physiological changes causing tension and pressure in vocal production).
160. See id. at 226-27 (stating that angry speech is characterized by higher mean frequency
and intensity); id. at 229 (noting that anger is among the emotions effectively communicated "in
a fairly indirect way over long distances").
161. Justices in the majorities might legitimately have determined, based on a more specific
factual showing, that hostility is in fact more frequently conveyed than compassion. They might
also legitimately have determined that, even if a compassionate approach frequently is
presented, the patients' rights still outweigh the counselors' right to convey that aspect of their
message in precisely that manner.
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debate is even entered into depends on whether alternate emotional
realities can be imagined, which in turn depends on the perspective to
which a Justice instinctively gravitates.
Thus, identification with different characters in the drama
informs one's common-sense view of the emotional dynamic and
content of the messages being conveyed. That view tells a member of
the Court how the message must be conveyed. These dual evaluations
deeply influence formulation of applicable law, both in valuing the
weight of state interests and perceiving the nature of the individual
rights at stake. This insight articulates a previously unnoticed aspect
of these cases that explains how the competing opinions can seem so
very far apart. But it also raises warning signals. Whenever one
affiliation is privileged, another is overlooked or dismissed. The
relative invisibility of common sense suggests that such choices will
not be sufficiently transparent as to permit open detection and
challenge. In this respect, emotional common sense may silently
privilege the views of cultural insiders while failing to account for the
perspectives of dissimilar others.
2. This I Believe
As the above discussion suggests, one's affiliation is closely tied
to values and beliefs; we most intuitively "feel" the perspective of
those with whom, we imagine, we agree. However, the sources of
emotional affiliation may be varied. Chief Justice Rehnquist, for
example, who wrote the majority opinions limiting anti-abortion
protest in Madsen and in Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western
New York, 162 presumably did not identify with the emotional
experiences of pro-choice protestors and abortion providers because of
1 63
shared ideology, given his general hostility to abortion rights.
Perhaps the "law-and-order" aspects of regulating protest were most
relevant to him in those cases; perhaps personal experiences of being a
medical patient, an educated professional, and a public person who
himself had drawn protest were more salient than the remote
164
possibility of being, or knowing anyone who might be, a protestor.
Shared beliefs provide one basis for affiliation, but only one.

162. 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
163. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 944-45 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that "Roe was wrongly
decided" and that the Constitution recognizes no fundamental right to abortion).
164. See Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376 (citing the importance of "public safety and order"); see
also supra note 144 (explaining that it is sufficient that the majority Justices do not emotionally
affiliate with the pro-life movement, not that they affirmatively affiliate with its opposite).
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In other cases, though, emotional common sense directly and
165
necessarily embodies values and beliefs. Gonzales v. Carhart,
upholding the constitutionality of a congressional ban on a particular
abortion procedure, is one of those cases. As emotions are responsive
to conscious and preconscious assessments of the attributes of our
environment, our emotional experiences-and those we presume
others to be having-can be excavated for what they show about such
assessments. 166 Such an excavation of the relevant portions of Carhart
shows that the majority has implicitly adopted specific-and highly
contested-views of pregnancy and motherhood, and that those views
drive its emotional common sense.
Those critical portions of Carhartare the following:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother
has for her child.... Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral
decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant
life they once created and sustained. See Brief for Sandra Cano et al. as Amici
Curiae .... Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow. See ibid.
In a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer not to
disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining themselves to the
required statement of risks the procedure entails....
It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning the way in which the
fetus will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State. The State has an interest in
ensuring so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to
regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more
profound when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she
allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn
16 7
child, a child assuming the human form.

Three aspects of this passage are important here. The Carhart
majority's assertions about what is "unexceptionable" and "selfevident" necessarily rely on, first, a common-sense judgment as to the
emotional bond between mothers and children. Second, the majority
implicitly imputes this bond to pregnant women and fetuses, and that
attribution drives the resulting assessment of emotional reality for
post-abortive women. Third, by buttressing its fireside induction with
self-reports by post-abortive women, provided in an amicus brief, the
majority signals its agreement with the belief structures that drive
those women's account of their emotional experiences. The result is an
expression of emotional common sense that positively bristles with
cultural judgment.
165. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
166. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
167. 550 U.S. at 159-60 (most internal citations omitted).
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The first of these moves is the least controversial. To speak of
the "bond of love the mother has for her child" is to presume that
mothers love their children, and this bond of love is deep, basic, and
universal. This is, indeed, deeply consonant with the lived experiences
of many (or most) people and would so appear in any number of
cultures and at different moments in time. 168 But, of course, this
supposed universal does not always obtain. As Justice Ginsburg
signals in dissent by qualifying the mother-love assertion with the
word "often," mothers sometimes do not love their children. 169 The folk
wisdom about mother-love reflects not universal truth but a value that
mothers should love their children. A failure of mother-love does not
signify that one is not a mother, but rather that she has failed to
conform to a valued cultural norm; she is a bad mother.
Nonetheless, that first supposition is less problematic than the
second. In the second move, the majority makes an implicit evaluation
that pregnant women and fetuses belong to the same emotional
categories as mothers and children. This move depends on the belief,
for these purposes at least, that pregnant women are mothers, and
that fetuses are children. The first sense in which the Court signals
168. Perhaps the existence and depth of a mother's love for her child is the sort of emotional
common sense about which we should be least worried, as it concerns a common and highly
accessible aspect of everyday human existence. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see
also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("[H]istorically [the law] has recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children."). The many
proverbs and platitudes about a mother's love are too numerous to count. See, e.g., MANY
THOUGHTS OF MANY MINDS 374 (Henry Southgate ed., 3d rev. ed. 1862) ("The tie which links
mother and child is of such pure and immaculate strength as to be never violated." (quoting
Washington Irving)). However, this supposedly universal bond admits of significant exceptions,
not just in contemporary culture, see infra note 169, but across time and culture as well. Romans
commonly exposed their infants (generally leading to their death) if the fathers did not recognize
them, if born to slaves, or if disabled. Paul Veyne, The Roman Empire: From Mother's Womb to
Last Will and Testament, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: FROM PAGAN ROME TO BYZANTIUM 9, 911 (Philippe Ari~s & Georges Duby eds., 1987) [hereinafter A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE].
Tempting though it may be to regard this practice as a brutal violation of the universal principle
of mother-love, that view would be ahistoric. Certainly some women felt a strong emotional
affinity for their fetuses and newborn infants. See Paul Veyne, Slavery, in A HISTORY OF PRIVATE
LIFE, supra, at 51, 52 (recounting the tale of a slave who "trembles at the thought that her
master-lover might kill the child she is expecting by him"). But such a bond was not inevitable,
and instead was largely shaped by cultural expectations and norms. Veyne, The Roman Empire:
From Mother's Womb to Last Will and Testament, supra, at 16-17; see also ROBIN LANE FOX,
PAGANS AND CHRISTIANS 343 (1986) (noting that cultural norms regarding exposure shifted with
the rise of Jewish and Christian belief systems); JOINT ASS'N OF CLASSICAL TEACHERS, THE
WORLD OF ATHENS: AN INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL ATHENIAN CULTURE 161-62 (1984) (citing
the Greek custom of exposing infants).
169. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Notwithstanding the 'bond of
love' women often have with their children, not all pregnancies, this Court has recognized, are
wanted, or even the product of consensual activity." (emphasis added, internal citations
omitted)).
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this categorization is with language. While sometimes pregnant or
post-abortive women are called "women," they also are referred to as
"expectant mothers" or "mothers"; similarly, the fetus is sometimes
referred to as such, and at other times-particularly in these
passages-is called "the infant life" or an "unborn child, a child
assuming the human form." 170 Through these narrative choices, we see
that Justice Kennedy, at least, perceives these labels to be
interchangeable. 171 The apparent emotional equivalence of his reaction
to the different categories reflects and feeds a belief that they are
inherently similar. 172
The Carhart majority, by thus eliding relevant categories, is
subtly signaling endorsement of an account of the world in which
abortion properly is regarded as the killing of a child by its mother,
and the emotional consequences of the former therefore will match
those of the latter. This half-submerged judgment is further
discernable in the Court's discussion of post-abortion regret. Setting
aside compelling arguments as to why it should not be in the business
of preventing regret, at least in this instance, 173 the invocation of such
regret sends an important signal of the Court's evaluation of how postabortive women should feel, which colors how it presents what they do
feel-which then in turn influences the constitutional judgment.
To say that a person-whether oneself or another-regrets (or
is likely to regret) an event is to make a cognitive judgment about the
attributes of that event. Emotions are not random, free-floating
phenomena: they are determined, in large part, by beliefs. 174 In
perhaps the most influential contemporary theoretical account of
cognitive appraisal and emotion, Richard Lazarus posited that

170. Id. at 159-60.
171. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 763 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to lateterm fetus as a "live-and-kicking child").
172. Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 29 ("[Under the] emotional categorization
hypothesis... having the same emotional reaction to two different but related events may help
weld them into one category so that the beliefs relevant to each become fungible or transferable
from one account to the other.").
173. See Blumenthal, supra note 52, at 166-81 (analyzing potential errors in individuals'
predictions of future emotional states); Guthrie, supra note 16, at 902-03 (identifying regret
aversion, regret overestimation, regret dampening, and regret learning as four reasons why the
Supreme Court's regret analysis in Carhartwas "misguided").
174. See, e.g., Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 40 ("[T]he occurrence of an emotion...
means that the emotional person is committed to particular beliefs about the situation."); Frijda
et al., supra note 101, at 1 (describing cognitive appraisal theory, widely accepted in
contemporary psychology, in which emotions are thought to "result from how the individual
believes the world to be, how events are believed to come about, and what implications events
are thought to have").
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emotions are bound to core relational themes. 175 Core relational
themes are a "psychobiological principle" captured as an "if-then"
formulation: if a person appraises his or her relationship to the
environment in a particular way then a specific emotion always
follows. 76 Thus, "anger" corresponds to the core relational theme of "a
demeaning offense against me and mine"; "sadness" corresponds to
"having experienced an irrevocable loss."177 Though "biological
universals link the if with the then," individual and cultural factors
"affect the if' by influencing the appraisal.1 78 All persons who perceive
their situation as satisfying one of the core relational themes will
experience the corresponding emotion. 179 But that perception is highly
variable, for what circumstances are thought to constitute "a
demeaning offense" or an "irrevocable loss" will depend on a person's
worldview, including internalized norms of her culture as well as her
own experience, goals, motivations, and beliefs. These judgments may
be lightning fast or more drawn out, but they are not generally a
process to which consciousness is drawn; rather than reasoning
through whether a given situation constitutes a particular theme, as a
18 0
general rule we simply perceive it to be so, and the emotion ensues.
The cognitive underpinnings of regret, a relatively complex
emotion, can be similarly unpacked. To say that a person "regrets"
something is to express that she has made a negative self-evaluation
based on past voluntary action now judged to be an avoidable mistake,
and that she has coupled that evaluation with a wish for an imagined

175. LAZARUS, supra note 45, at 81-82; see also Richard S. Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of
the Emotions, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION, supra note 50, at 163, 164 (arguing that "the
appraised significance of what is happening involves a particular kind of relationalmeaning").
176. Lazarus, UniversalAntecedents of the Emotions, supra note 175, at 164-65.
177. Id. at 164 tbl.1; see also Paul Ekman, Antecedent Events and Emotions, in THE NATURE
OF EMOTION, supra note 50, at 146, 147 (describing a similar view of emotion elicitors); Frijda,
supra note 52, at 155-56 (endorsing the theory of emotional antecedents).
178. Lazarus, UniversalAntecedents of the Emotions, supra note 175, at 167-68.
179. The theory of core relational themes simultaneously explains human emotional
universals (barring severe dysfunction or brain damage, we all are capable of feeling fear,
disgust, and so on) and human emotional diversity (what causes such fear or disgust is widely
variable). To the extent that true universalities exist, they likely reflect adaptations to "the most
important or frequent events our ancestors encountered," such that all humans would recognize
the situation as constituting the core relational theme. See Ekman, supra note 177, at 147-49
(theorizing that only a limited number of basic and evolutionarily salient antecedents are
inherited-such as "anticipation of physical pain" leading to "fear"-and that emotional
responses to novel events are acquired through experience, with those most resembling the
primary antecedents acquired more readily).
180. Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 16 ("[A]ttributions for affect are usually completely
implicit, rather than being explicit, deliberative, or thoughtful.").
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81
reality that would have obtained had the action been different.
Using this theme it is possible to spell out the subtext of the Carhart
Court's assertions about regret.
To say, in close narrative conjunction with the invocation of
mother-love, that women regret abortion is to say something like the
following:
" A woman who aborts destroys the possibility of experiencing the
profound bond of love she would have had with her child;
" once she realizes this, she will see that her choice to abort was
mistaken, and that she could have avoided that mistake; and
* she will imagine the irreplaceable love she could have had and
accordingly will suffer regret, perhaps so severe as to cause
mental health problems.

This is perhaps not as startling as it may seem (to many) at
first blush. After all, the Court does not assert that all post-abortive
women will follow this chain of thought and come to feel this way, just
that some will. But unless that "some" is a significant percentage of
post-abortive women, it would not be worth mentioning the
phenomenon, any more than it would be worth supposing that some
post-abortive women will have, say, marital problems. 18 2 Further, this
is not an offhand remark; it is one of the main rationales put forward
for a substantial restriction on previability abortion, a restriction the
181. See Guthrie, supra note 16, at 882-83 & n.25 (synthesizing varying definitions of
regret).
182. This might be otherwise were the ruling designed to protect an identifiable subset of
women, as was the case with striking down marital notification laws. Those laws harmed a
relatively small group-those with abusive husbands-but harm to that group was considered
legally significant. Importantly, though, that rationale served not to restrict rights for women to
whom the concern was irrelevant, but to lift a restriction for all women since it might have
gravely harmed some of them. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893-94
(1992) ("The spousal notification requirement is thus likely to prevent a significant number of
women from obtaining an abortion.... The analysis does not end with the one percent of women
upon whom the statute operates; it begins there."). Had Carhartinvolved a state requirement of
extensive factual disclosure prior to choosing an intact dilation and extraction ("D&E") abortion,
perhaps such a tight focus might have been permissible, on the theory that disclosure would
dissuade only those women who later would regret the abortion had they known of the specific
procedures involved, while leaving intact the rights of others. The value of disclosure to that
subset would have to be weighed against any negative impact it might have on all other women.
See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science
Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1, 36 (2008) (noting potential of
graphic disclosure to create a psychologically coercive "emotional bias" against abortion). This
would be a different question, though, as Carhart involved not a disclosure requirement but a
ban on the procedure. See 550 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The solution the Court
approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the
different procedures and their attendant risks. Instead, the Court deprives them of the right to
make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.").
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law purports strongly to disfavor.18 3 By giving regret pride of place,
the Carhart majority has signaled that it regards such regret as being
a significant part of the natural order of things: women should feel
these things, and therefore many of them will. 184
This conclusion is deepened by looking to the one source of
information-other than his common sense--cited by Justice
Kennedy: the amicus brief submitted by Sandra Cano and "postabortive women who have suffered the adverse emotional and
psychological effects of abortion.' ' 8 5 Close examination of the
testimonials in the Cano Brief--culled from responses to a survey by
"Operation Outcry" asking "[h]ow has abortion affected you?"-reveals
that women who report regretting their abortions do so because of a
very specific appraisal of their experiences, one more bluntly stated
than that articulated by the Carhart Court but sharing a common
root. 18 6 They have come to see themselves as mothers, their aborted
183. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) ("[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to [viability],
the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation
by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated."); see
also Casey, 505 U.S. at 878-79 (altering trimester framework of Roe but affirming viability as an
important demarcation by finding that "a State may not prohibit any woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability").
184. See Van Zandt, supra note 10, at 916 ("Commonsense theorizing provides a natural
morality grounded in the way things are thought to be. ... [P]eople merge the 'is' and the
'ought.' "). By thus "scripting" regret, the Court is attempting also to enact it, to impose regret as
the appropriate cultural script for abortion. Cf. Calhoun, supra note 57, at 220-22 (describing
emotional scripts as the culturally prescribed means by which people learn what emotions are
appropriate under particular circumstances).
185. Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1, Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (No. 05-380) [hereinafter Cano Brief]. Sandra Cano never had an abortion. She
surrendered a baby for adoption because (in her words) she "had a natural desire to have [the]
baby and to raise her." Id. at app. 4,
9. Justifying her representativeness, Cano asserted that
she "know[s] what it is like to feel like a mother who helped terminate the life of her own child,"
because her role in Doe v. Bolton led her to feel responsible for the abortions obtained by others.
Id. at app. 6-7, 1 6.
186. Operation Outcry is a project of The Justice Foundation, which authored the Cano
Brief. See The Justice Foundation, http://www.txjf.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (describing its
mission as "protecting the fundamental freedoms and rights essential to the preservation of
American society"); Operation Outcry, http://www.operationoutcry.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2009)
(explaining that Operation Outcry is a project of The Justice Foundation). The testimonial
excerpts appended to the brief are from 178 women, selected from "the approximately 2,000 on
file with The Justice Foundation." Cano Brief, supra note 185, at app. 11. The Carhartmajority
cited specifically to pp. 22-24 of the Cano Brief, 550 U.S. at 159, which (1) present the findings of
David Reardon, a pro-life activist and one of the most controversial figures in the post-abortion
syndrome debate, see Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
21, 2007, at 40 (describing Reardon as the Moses of the pro-life activists); Wikipedia, the Free
Encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Reardon (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) (noting
that Reardon is a pro-life activist who has written numerous articles and books on the
"controversial issue of mental health effects associated with abortion"), and (2) synopsizes some
of the women's testimonials and refers the Court to the Appendix. This choice of focus was not
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fetuses as dead children, and the abortion as murder. These beliefs
drive the emotional consequences, including regret.
The self-reported pain of these testimonials is acute. The
declarants report being depressed; considering or attempting
suicide;' 87 and experiencing guilt, 8 8 sadness, grief, 8 9 "low self-esteem"
or diminished "self-worth,"'190 and damaged relationships and
marriages.' 9' Every single woman either explicitly or implicitly (and
usually the former) attributes these ill effects to her having had one or
more abortions. Many of these regretful women believe that their
abortions caused serious harm to their mental health. Indeed, they
believe the mistake of abortion to have been so enormous as to infect
virtually every aspect of their lives. They describe eating disorders
19 4
and weight problems, 92 drug and alcohol abuse,193 and promiscuity.
Some complain of lowered grades in school and trouble at their jobs. 195
Quite a few report problems relating to the children they now have,
96
most frequently describing themselves as overprotective mothers,
but also reporting difficulty bonding with and "feeling natural

lost on The Justice Foundation, which continues to solicit testimonials. See Operation Outcry,
http://www.operationoutcry.org/ (follow "Why Operation Outcry is Collecting Declarations"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ('The power of testimony touched the Supreme Court,
which cited pages of sworn testimony-not the legal arguments of The Justice Foundation.").
The Cano Brief also reports on the process and findings of the South Dakota Task Force to
Study Abortion, created in 2005 to study, inter alia, abortion's effect on mental health and "the
nature of the relationship between a pregnant woman and her unborn child." Cano Brief, supra
note 185, at 16-21 & n.59 (citing REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY

ABORTION 6 (2005) [hereinafter SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE], available at http://www.
dakotavoice.com/Docs/South%20Dakota%2OAbortion%20Task%2OForce%20Report.pdf.
Those
findings rested on a similar folk data set-2,000 affidavits of post-abortive women, collected by
Operation Outcry-as well as on testimony of persons identified as experts and laypersons who
both supported and objected to abortion rights. Id. at 17. Similar affidavits were offered in
support of Norma McCorvey's 2003 motion for relief from the judgment in Roe v. Wade. See
McCorvey v. Hill, 385 F.3d 846, 850 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2004) (Jones, J., concurring). Moreover,
Texas has relied on such narratives in drafting standard pre-abortion disclosures. See TEX. DEP'T
OF HEALTH, A WOMAN's RIGHT TO KNOw 16 (2003), available at www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/
pdf/booklet.pdf (warning of emotional risks in choosing abortion).
187. E.g., Cano Brief, supranote 185, at apps. 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20.
188. E.g., id. at apps. 11, 13, 17, 18.
189. E.g., id. at apps. 12, 13.
190. E.g., id. at apps. 13, 14, 18, 20.
191. E.g., id. at apps. 11, 12, 14, 38, 55, 60, 62, 74 ("I became a doormat."), 85 ("When my
husband verbally or emotionally abused me, I allowed it because I felt I deserved it.").
192. E.g., id. at apps. 13-14 ("morbid obesity"), 30 (bulimia), 32 ("overweight-thin"), 45
(weight problem), 98.
193. E.g., id. at apps. 16, 17 (alcoholism), 19 (drug addiction).
194. E.g., id. at apps. 14, 15, 22, 24.
195. E.g., id. at apps. 14, 17, 55, 60.
196. E.g., id. at apps. 23, 32, 45, 51, 65, 76.
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maternal feelings" toward their children; 197 some even report abusing
8
their children.19
These testimonials are legitimate on their own terms, as they
reflect how these women perceive the effects of abortion on their lives;
they are a window into each testimonial writer's inner worldview, a
worldview she shares with affiliated others. In this sense, then, the
Cano Brief proves Justice Kennedy's point: some women regret having
abortions. 199 But the worldview underlying their emotional reality is
not properly generalizable to other people, for it relies on culturally
contestable-and, indeed, profoundly contested-beliefs and values.
Operation Outcry makes its underlying belief system explicit: it
clearly states that its goal is to end abortion because it constitutes the
killing of a human infant by its mother, and that by gathering
testimonials it intends to show that mothers suffer emotionally when
they kill their children. 200 While most declarants simply self-report
negative emotional effects without making that worldview explicit,
quite a few do, and those that do tell the same story. They make clear
that they regret their abortions because they have come to believe, as
they had not before, that the fetus belonged to the category of "child"
and they to that of "mother." 20 1 They therefore now perceive
197. E.g., id. at apps. 48, 49, 55.
198. E.g., id. at app. 75; see also id. at 22 (presenting views of Dr. David Reardon, who
summarizes many of the above reports).
199. See Ekman, supra note 177, at 146, 148 (noting that self-reports tell us "how people
represent their emotional experience"). The Cano Brief does not, of course, prove anything about
the extent of this phenomenon, including the percentage of post-abortive women who feel regret.
The biased sampling problem is obvious. Operation Outcry requests "testimonies of mothers who
have taken the life of their own unborn babies and of others who have suffered harm from
abortion, so as to protect women, men, and children from the destruction that abortion causes."
The Justice Foundation, http://www.txjf.org/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2009). Declarants are asked
whether The Justice Foundation may "file Friend of the Court briefs on [her] behalf to ban or
restrict abortion." Operation Outcry, Women's Declaration Form, How My Abortion Affected Me,
https://www.assuresign.net/ASR2801/Signature/DeclarationFormF.aspx
(last visited Apr. 10,
2009). It therefore is entirely predictable that all or nearly all the women submitting statements
would share the organization's perspective. Indeed, the South Dakota Task Force noted that
ninety-nine percent of the post-abortive women's statements asserted that "abortion is
destructive of the rights, interests, and health of women and should not be legal." SOUTH DAKOTA
TASK FORCE, supra note 186, at 7. The Cano Brief did not submit a single testimonial from a
woman who reported having her abortion by intact D&E.
200. See
Operation
Outcry,
About
Us,
http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp
?pageid=27784 (last visited Apr. 10, 2009) ("OPERATION OUTCRY is the project... to end legal
abortion by exposing the truth about its devastating impact on women, men and families.").
201. Many women express anger that they were not told-particularly by medical
providers-that the fetus was a human being, and report feeling duped into committing murder.
See, e.g., Cano Brief, supra note 185, at apps. 70, 75, 92 ("[M]y baby whom they called my
'fetus'...."), 98 ("I was told that... [the fetus] was just a seed, [or] a blob of blood."), 99 ("[O]n
public TV, I saw an abortion and realized [the fetus] was alive and I was guilty of murder."), 102,
105-06 (stating that it was not a fetus, but a baby; not fetal tissue but a life); see also Operation
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themselves as being guilty of deliberate infanticide, a cognitive
recasting of the experience that causes them great pain. 20 2 Many
explicitly tie this view of themselves to religious beliefs. These women
describe a relationship with God and express the strong view that
having aborted was a transgression against God, because of which
they have suffered and for which they have sought divine
203
forgiveness.
Though these may be sincere and deeply held beliefs for these
women, they are not beliefs to which other women may be required or
expected to conform. To reject any aspect of the underlying belief
structure disrupts the resulting emotional consequences of abortion.
Whether a woman will experience "guilt," to pick one commonly
expressed emotion, depends on whether she views herself as having
"transgressed a moral imperative." 20 4 Thus, to use the religious belief
example, one who believes that God is the source of morals, that God
has set a moral standard forbidding abortion, and that she is
answerable to God's moral commands, will feel guilt for having an
abortion. Similarly, the core relational theme for shame is "failing to
live up to an ego-ideal." If that woman would like to see herself as one
that always follows God's commands, she also will experience shame
at having failed to live up to her expectations. 20 5 But one who does not
hold those constituent beliefs will not experience that guilt or shame.
Even the attribution of subsequent emotional problems to
abortion is reflective of an underlying belief system. Abortion is, for
most, a heavy-heart event; that much is safe to generalize. 206 Even a
woman who desires to terminate her pregnancy and who rejects the
Outcry, About Us, http://www.operationoutcry.org/pages.asp?pageid=27784 (last visited Apr. 10,
2009) ("OPERATION OUTCRY exposes the two great lies surrounding legalized abortion: 1)
abortion is good and safe for women; and, 2) it is not a baby being aborted.").
202. See Cano Brief, supra note 185, at 23-24 & nn.84 ("After killing my children, I did not
deserve to be a mother."), 88 ("The hardest part was knowing that 'it was my choice' that caused
my baby's death."; "I cannot get my children back. They are dead."; "Only afterward did I realize
the TRUTH! ...I had killed my child!"). These testimonials are in the portion of the Cano Brief
specifically cited by the Carhartmajority. 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
203. E.g., id. at apps. 12-14, 21, 25, 27, 31, 34, 37, 39, 43, 49, 50, 52, 55, 59-61, 66-68, 72,
75, 79, 83, 87, 92, 96, 100, 102.
204. Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of the Emotions, supra note 175, at 164 tbl.1.
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court is surely
correct that, for most women, abortion is a painfully difficult decision."). Even those strenuously
objecting to the idea that abortion is psychologically damaging to women agree that, for most,
being in the position of considering or having an abortion is emotionally difficult. See, e.g., Am.
Psychological Ass'n, Briefing Paper on the Impact of Abortion on Women 2 (2005) [hereinafter
APA Briefing Paper] ("Freely chosen legal abortion, particularly in the first trimester, has not
been found to be associated with severe psychological trauma, despite the fact that it occurs in
the stressful context of unwanted pregnancy. The time of greatest stress is before the abortion.").
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abortion-is-murder belief system is likely to feel some cluster of
negative emotions, perhaps even acutely. 20 7 She may be angry or
resentful at having been impregnated and put in the position of
having to choose; she may be fearful of the effect an unwanted child
would have on her life; she may be embarrassed by failing to prevent
the pregnancy; she may be anxious about the medical procedure; she
may feel hurt that others did not support her in the way she wanted;
she may feel sadness that she did not feel capable of having a child at
that moment. 2°8 But these emotional experiences will be as diverse as
are her judgments about the peculiar attributes of her situation.
Absent a set of beliefs identifying the abortion as a grave moral harm
that marks her as an extremely bad actor, she is not likely to regret
the abortion but rather the circumstances surrounding or
necessitating it. Nor is she likely to attribute every difficulty in her
life as being caused by the abortion itself as opposed to those
surrounding circumstances or other life causes. 20 9 But the strong
emotions experienced by women who do make these cognitive
attributions regarding the abortion itself feed in on and continually
reinforce themselves: their intensity makes the underlying beliefs
seem particularly valid, and this intensity serves as internal feedback
that the attribution is a correct one. 210 It is the depth of the Cano
declarants' commitment to the assessment of themselves as the
207. APA Briefing Paper, supra note 206, at 2 ("A woman's emotional responses after
experiencing an unwanted pregnancy terminated by abortion are complex and may involve a
combination of positive and negative emotions."); Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Mental Health:
Myths and Realities, 9 GUTrMACHER POL'Y REV. 8, 11 (2006) (noting that "it is not unusual for a
woman to experience a range of often contradictory emotions after having an abortion, just as it
would not be unusual for a woman who carried her unintended pregnancy to term" and
interviewing hotline founder who states that "there is no 'right' way to feel after an abortion").
208. See, e.g., Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortion-Highly Charged and
Rife with Misleading Research, 10 CAN. MED. ASS'N J. 1257, 1257-58 (2003) (stating that
research shows that abortion itself is "psychologically benign" for most women but is chosen
because of difficult circumstances such as financial instability, lack of a supportive relationship,
lack of psychological readiness, or poor mental health).
209. See, e.g., Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 15-21 (describing emotional attribution
processes); see also APA Briefing Paper, supra note 206, at 2 ("The effects of abortion cannot be
separated from the effects of the experience of unwanted pregnancy and from the context in
which the pregnancy occurred.... [I]n some cases it is the unwanted pregnancy that is the
source of stress, not necessarily the abortion."). Indeed, there is reason to believe that women
with a complex constellation of beliefs about their abortions are less likely to have strong, beliefreinforcing emotions than are women who believe, simply and clearly, that they murdered their
children. See Clore & Gasper, supra note 46, at 37 (noting evidence that "simpler mental
structures" about an event, such as a clear cognitive schema, "lead to more intense emotional
reactions").
210. Id. at 24-26, 30 ("[S]pecific emotions ... implicate particular beliefs, so that the sensory
feelings involved in the emotion may act as evidence of the truth of that belief and others
consistent with it ....
[Such emotions] increase certainty or commitment.").
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ultimate bad mothers-ones who deliberately and needlessly killed
their own children-that drives their attribution of nearly all of their
21 1
emotional difficulties to the abortion.
For the Carhart Court to endorse so explicitly-and rely on so
heavily-the phenomenon of post-abortion regret as articulated by the
Cano declarants, and particularly to do so in order to cabin the rights
of all pregnant women (and abortion providers), even those for whom
regret is a nonissue, is therefore to validate and privilege that
contested set of underlying beliefs. This privileging is made quite clear
in a report of the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, which
in recommending an outright ban on abortion considered an expanded
version of the same testimonial data set from Operation Outcry:
[T]he pregnant mother is not told prior to her abortion that the procedure will terminate
the life of a human being. The psychological consequences can be devastating when that
that this information was withheld.... Her anger at being
woman learns ...
deceived.., is exacerbated by her realization that she was implicated in the killing of
her own child in utero ....[T]he psychological harm of knowing she killed her own child
is often devastating ....
...[I]t
is simply unrealistic to expect that a pregnant mother is capable of being
involved in the termination of the life of her own child without risk of suffering
significant psychological trauma and distress. To do so is beyond the normal, natural,
and healthy2 capability of a woman whose natural instincts are to protect and nurture
21
her child.

211. While there is no need to question the declarants' sincerity or the depth of their pain,
there is every reason to be skeptical about their attribution to abortion of all of the diverse
phenomena they report. Several testimonials make clear the dangers of accepting these
assertions at face value. Perhaps the most extreme case is one declarant's claim that she
"became pregnant later and [the] baby was killed in [a] car accident," an accidental death she
believed to be "because of [the earlier] abortion," presumably as divine retribution. Cano Brief,
supra note 185, at app. 99. Though this may be a cherished and sincerely held belief for that
individual, it is not one that others should be compelled to credit. A number of other women
report serious mental illness, which though possibly magnified by an abortion perceived as
traumatic is highly unlikely to have been caused by one. See, e.g., id. at app. 26 ("Abortion made
my bi-polar disorder worse!"). Other women report involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations, id.
at app. 30 (stating that she was hospitalized post-abortion for anxiety and depression), 52 ("I...
ended up in the psychiatric ward of a mental hospital."), 104 ("I suffered a nervous breakdown
and spent six weeks in mental hospital."), and extensive treatment with psychotropic
medications, id. at app. 24 ("[1] have been prescribed as many as 10 different psychotropic
medications."), 93-94 (describing how she repeatedly sought psychiatric help and was put on
many different medications). Many of the reported phenomena are exceedingly common, such as
difficulties in marriage and child-raising. Some are particularly common for women, such as
eating disorders. There is no reason to credit their sole attribution to abortion when such
phenomena are widespread and admit of so many other, more quotidian causes. Rather, the
extreme degree to which these women believe the abortion to be the cause of such wide-ranging
problems underscores the strength of their underlying belief system and the extent to which they
believe themselves to have transgressed valued cultural norms.
212. SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE, supra note 186, at 47-48; see also Reva B. Siegel, The New
Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U.
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This belief-driven view of what emotional consequences "naturally"
flow from abortion similarly animates the Carhart Court, though the
Court's articulation is nowhere near so blunt. Women who abort have
killed their children; they are bad mothers; and when they realize
this, assuming they are not insane, they should and will suffer
enormous regret.
The final level of Carhart's regret analysis--centering on the
specifics of how the fetus is removed by intact dilation and extraction
(or "intact D&E")-similarly reveals meaning structures. Having set
forth that a significant number of women will regret abortion, and
having endorsed the idea that preventing such regret can justify a
state's restriction on (otherwise protected) abortion, the Carhart
majority announces that abortion by intact D&E particularly will be
regretted, because it is disgusting. 213 In this portion of the discussion
the Court includes a graphic description of piercing the skull and
vacuuming the "fast-developing brain" of the fetus. 2 14 Justice Kennedy
displays a strong emotional reaction to these facts, calling them
"shocking" and "brutal."215 But most invasive surgical procedures
would appear extremely disgusting if fully described. 21 6 The disgusting
aspect of this procedure is regarded as noteworthy only because it
involves destruction of a semi-developed fetus, and this regard reflects
a moral valuation-reliant on the belief system revealed above-of the
status and worth of that fetus. 21 7 Kennedy's morally infused emotions
ILL. L. REV. 991, 993 (analyzing "the state's claimed interest in protecting women from abortion"
and showing "that these justifications rest on gender stereotypes about women's capacity and
women's roles").
213. The Court gave two descriptions of the physical reality of intact D&E. The first,
provided by (in the Court's words) "an abortion doctor," is relatively clinical. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 138 (2007). The second, given by a nurse observing a procedure, is far more vivid
and graphic, and focuses on movements by the fetus suggestive of those made by live babies. Id.
at 138-39 ("Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the back of his head, and the baby's arms jerked
out, like a startle reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is going to fall....
[The doctor] sucked the baby's brains out... [and] threw the baby in a pan."). The second
narrative adds little of technical importance, but clearly conveys a more salient and powerful
emotional message; additionally, it repeatedly uses the word "baby" in lieu of "fetus," the term
used by the doctor.
214. Id. at 160.
215. Id.
216. "Envelope violations," or violations of the external bodily "envelope" that reveal bodily
fluids, internal organs, and the like, are a core elicitor of disgust. See Paul Rozin et al., Disgust,
in HANDBOOK OF EMOTIONS, supra note 60, at 637, 641-42 ("[Humans have] fragile body
envelopes that, when breached, reveal blood and soft viscera .... "). Intact D&E recruits this sort
of instinctive disgust reaction because of the breach of the female's body through the vagina and
a breach of the fetus's body through the head, exposing developing brain material.
217. See id. at 643-44 (asserting that disgust is recruited in response to activities regarded
as morally contemptible, and that such "moralized" disgust "guards the sanctity of the soul as
well as the purity of the body"); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:
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are so strong that he believes that most doctors would decline to
provide those details to patients, that many patients who were to hear
them would decline to have an abortion at all, and that any patient
who did have an intact D&E abortion she later came to regret would
be traumatized significantly by later learning those details.2 18 But this
chain of supposition presumes that doctors and patients will share
Justice Kennedy's evaluation of the procedure as morally (not just
physically) disgusting. 219 Thus, a Justice's personal emotional
engagement with a situation can profoundly shape the facts that
appear to him commonsensical; further, its strength can obscure his
ability to perceive equally legitimate perspectives.
This is the great error of the Carhart majority's invocation of
emotional common sense. When the Court adopts as relevant to the
rights of others the amicus parties' stories of grief, guilt, loss, and
lowered self-esteem, it adopts the valuations and beliefs leading to
those emotional outputs and forces a false consensus on them. When it
privileges the individual Justices' own emotional stake in abortion and
reaction to the intact D&E method, it ignores other permissible
meaning structures as to those phenomena. These are not empirical
errors. These are cultural judgment errors. Under the guise of
emotional common sense, the Court has smuggled in an account of the
world as it is and should be on precisely the core contested issue:
whether previability abortion properly is regarded as the killing of an
infant by its mother. It is diversity of belief on that issue that our
current law of reproductive choice purports to protect, 220 and the
CarhartCourt has taken sides while pretending to be stating nothing
more than common sense about basic emotional reality.

DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 13 (2004) (arguing that shame and disgust "are especially likely
to be normatively distorted").
218. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 134 (stating that "a necessary effect" will be to reduce the "absolute
number of late-term abortions," prompting the medical profession to find "less shocking
methods").
219. Arguably, one must also assess that the procedure was not justified by some greater
good, for example, avoiding giving birth to a child with such profound defects as to cause its
immediate post-partum death or enormous suffering-factors that are particularly likely to be
present when intact D&E is chosen. See Brief of Respondents at 5, 9, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No.
05-1382) (describing medical testimony that intact D&E may be especially useful in presence of
fetal abnormalities and of greatest benefit to patients with serious medical conditions).
220. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973):
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at
any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is
not in a position to speculate as to the answer. It should be sufficient to note briefly
the wide divergence of thinking on this most sensitive and difficult question.
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As this Part has shown, then, emotional common sense is a
highly complex phenomenon dressed up as a simple one. While
emotional common sense sometimes may be judged by its empirical
legitimacy-for sometimes a folk belief about emotions really is just
true for just about everybody, and sometimes it is just wrong for just
about everybody-that metric is not always sufficient. Emotional
common sense represents one way in which law may pass contentious
judgments of value on by passing them off as uncontestable matters of
fact. 221 Thus, in the great expanse of conflicting correct views a
different metric is needed, one that looks to the values of
transparency, inclusion, and diversity.
III. EMOTIONAL COMMON SENSE AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

A PRELIMINARY PRESCRIPTION
permeates
law.
Certain
Emotional
common
sense
constitutional issues simply cannot be resolved without analysis of
emotion: as the discussion of anti-sympathy instructions
demonstrated, unless one has a view as to the meaning and function of
"sympathy" and "sentiment," it is not possible to formulate any rule.
To the extent that judges' own emotional stakes in issues and
instinctive affiliations with different constituencies influence their
seemingly commonsensical assessments, constitutional jurisprudence
may be particularly saturated with emotional common sense. The
indeterminacy of much constitutional law creates a "zone of
reasonableness" within which emotion, intuition, and other
traditionally disfavored factors may assume a greater role. 222 But

emotional common sense is of uneven epistemological value. It is
prone to instrumental use. It influences how the Justices perceive
relevant facts and law and provides a fig leaf under which to impose
contested views of social justice and the good life. It is largely invisible
223
to its holder but absurd to one whose common sense lies elsewhere.
Nor is a natural stopping point clear. With common sense, to some
degree, it is "turtles all the way down. '224 What to do?
221. I am grateful to Dan Kahan for suggesting this elegant description of the phenomenon.
222. Posner, supra note 76, at 1053, 1059 (in describing those elements, " '[p]olitics' is not
quite right," but ideology-defined as "a body of more or less coherent bedrock beliefs about
social, economic, and political questions, or, more precisely perhaps, a worldview that shapes
one's answers to those questions"-comes closer).
223. Frijda et al., supra note 101, at 3 (emotional "arguments cherished by one side are
regarded as meaningless by the other side, and vice versa").
224. GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION, supra note 26, at 28-29:
There is an Indian story... about an Englishman who, having been told that the
world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in
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The trick with emotional common sense as constitutional law
is, as with common sense more generally, to chart the sensible middle
course. 225 The essential first step is-as this Article has attempted
thus far to do-to identify its presence. The second step is not to take
the well-worn path in law and seek to eliminate it; this is entirely
impractical and might be destructive even were it possible. A starting
principle, then, is that emotional common sense surely has a proper
place somewhere within constitutional lawmaking. 226 We must seek to
recognize when law's embrace of emotional common sense entails an
unwitting absorption of inaccurate evaluations of the world, when it
silently enacts avoidable favoritism or embodies a judgment to which
all members of the affected citizenry may well not-and should not
227
have to--ascribe, and when it truly tells law what it needs to know.
turn on the back of a turtle, asked (perhaps he was an ethnographer; it is the way
they behave), what did the turtle rest on? Another turtle. And that turtle? "Ah, Sahib,
after that it is turtles all the way down."
Indeed, even this author's identification of instances of emotional common sense restsnecessarily-on her own. The nature of common sense is to make itself visible when one
disagrees with it. It therefore is particularly important that other scholars follow this first effort
and identify the emotional common sense they see in law, for it may well be different, and those
differences may matter in ways this author cannot predict.
225. Meehl, supra note 33, at 93. It is worth reiterating that the objective is not to arrive at a
definitive account of the proper role of emotion in law or in judging; this is a life's work, a manyfaceted project to which many people are devoted. See, e.g., Maroney, supra note 102, at 119-23,
134-36 (discussing how "many scholars-from fields as diverse as psychology, law, philosophy,
and neuroscience-have begun to study the intersection of emotion and law"). It is, rather, to
delineate within the confines of Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence the proper role for
emotional common sense, an implicit corpus of beliefs, theories, and perspectives about emotion.
This too is, of course, a long-term project, though it is possible to begin it here.
226. See Gewirtzman, supra note 24, at 626 (seeking to articulate "emotion's positive impact
on constitutional culture").
227. Meehl, supra note 33, at 93 (suggesting that though "it would be nice to have some sort
of touchstone as to pragmatic validity, some quick and easy objective basis for deciding where to
place our bets" when evaluating common sense in law, no easy test presents itself).
This topic is closely related to several others, beyond the scope of this Article, that have
received more attention in the literature: the proper attitude of law toward social science
generally; "judicial notice" and non-evidentiary facts; and whether jurors are preferred as factfinders because they embody the perspective of common people. See Richard M. Fraher,
Adjudicative Facts, Non-Evidence Facts, and Permissible Jury Background Information, 62 IND.
L.J. 333, 342-43 (1987) (discussing unclear relationship between "adjudicative facts" and jurors'
permissible use of background knowledge, the latter being thought to include "unanimity of
belief, common knowledge, knowledge shared by the community, a common fund of knowledge,
data notoriously accepted by all, information generally known, facts beyond reasonable dispute,
or information whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"); Meehl, supra note 33, at 66
(discussing potentially conflicting roles of empirical social science and "fireside inductions"
(commonsense, anecdotal, introspective, and culturally transmitted beliefs about human
behavior) in making and enforcing the law); Redding, supra note 9, at 111-13 (detailing the
"highly neurotic, conflict-ridden ambivalent affair" between law and social science, particularly
psychology); Van Zandt, supra note 10, at 939 (noting that the entire project of legal realism was
concerned with "the interaction of law and commonsense ideas").
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A. EvaluatingCategories of the Supreme Court's
Emotional Common Sense
This Part proposes that emotional common sense is most likely
to provide a legitimate basis for law where it takes as its subject
consciously accessible emotional experiences amenable to no
significant diversity. However, such reliance entails risk. Justices
(and, for that matter, all lawmakers) are likely to overestimate vastly
the extent to which situations meet those criteria, and in so doing they
may enshrine inaccuracy and oversimplification. Emotional common
sense is least likely to provide a legitimate basis for law when Justices
seek to evaluate the complex emotional experiences of others. In so
doing they often will project their emotional reality-their emotional
stake in a particular issue, for example, or their beliefs as to how they
would feel in a given situation-onto the supposed reality of others.
This projection creates the dangers of false generalization and value
imposition. As potential for illegitimacy increases, sources outside the
Justice's own worldview-organized empiricism, lessons from history,
perspectives of amicus parties, and the like-become progressively
more important. However, recourse to other voices and to noncasual
empiricism is far from a panacea. In many situations the normatively
proper stance is for legal decisionmakers to recognize the valuereflective nature of their common sense and to justify openly its
imposition on others.
The first point-that the Court is on relatively solid ground in
invoking a common-sense view about emotion that is highly likely to
be substantially true for all affected persons-is well illustrated by a
return to our examination of Cohen. The Cohen Court relied on its
understanding of the manifestation and function of emotional speech
in ordinary communication. 228 Its emotional common sense was
relatively likely to be accurate given that the emotional aspects of
verbal and written interpersonal communication are the stuff of
everyday life for most people, including the Justices. 229 Further, the
228. See supra Part II.A.
229. This applies equally to the fighting words doctrine as explicated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the application of which drove, in part, the reasoning in Cohen.
The test for fighting words relies in significant part on emotional common sense, as it requires
courts to determine what words, "when addressed to the ordinary citizen," are "as a matter of
common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 20 (1971) (citing Chaplinsky); see also Fairman, supra note 81, at 1731-32 (showing changing
cultural norms in fighting-words doctrine concerning the word "fuck"). Moreover, the fighting
words doctrine privileges folk judgments-"ordinary men" of "common intelligence" can tell when
the conditions are met, and the job of the judge is to stand in the shoes of those ordinary men.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
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emotions at issue in Cohen-primarily anger-were relatively basic
and universal, 230 and the communication in question was short and
unambiguous. This pervasive, simple, and consciously accessible
domain is one of those in which emotional common sense is most likely
to reflect stable truth.2 31 While it may have been better to shore up
that commonsensical evaluation with other data, there is so little
diversity on the bottom-line issue-emotional communication is
232
distinctive-that doing so may not have been worth the effort.
As the discussion of anti-sympathy instructions revealed,
though, where parameters are more complicated the Court is more
likely to invoke empirically erroneous views. 233 The task given capital
sentencing jurors-group-based moral decisionmaking about whether
a particular individual will live or die at the hands of others at some
point in the future-is highly complex, and assessment of complexity
creates more room for error. Further, such moral decisionmaking
involves at least partially nonconscious mental processes. The Court's
erroneous views on emotion's role in moral decisionmaking are
perhaps most convincingly shown by scientific studies designed to
illuminate such processes, but that level of understanding is
inaccessible via common sense.
Unfortunately, errors of the second sort are likely to
outnumber safe calls of the Cohen sort. People-including the
Justices-so frequently believe complex emotional phenomena to be
basic, and ones that admit of significant diversity to be universal, that
they will wrongly assume emotional common sense adequately
answers too many situations. For example, as the sidewalk-counselor
issue in Hill involved an aspect of emotional communication to which
significant complexity and diversity apply-precisely how emotional
communication will be distinctive in a given situation-greater effort
to look outside one's own "obvious" perspective was required. 234 We

230. See supra note 52 (discussing the small universe of evolutionarily basic emotions).
231. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (presenting the view that common sense
sometimes is a legitimate epistemological source and suggesting contexts in which it is most
likely to be such a source).
232. Though further research will illuminate similar situations relevant to constitutional
jurisprudence, some situations come easily to mind. For example, it is relatively clear that a
person faced with imminent physical danger is highly likely to be afraid. See Lazarus, Universal
Antecedents of the Emotions, supra note 175, at 164 tbl.1. The Court therefore would be on solid
ground in supposing that a detainee credibly threatened with torture by police or military
officials would be afraid and would seek to shape his behavior to reduce both the danger and his
fear. However, how he might shape his behavior, and what impact fear will have on the
truthfulness of statements made while in its grip, would be far more complicated issues.
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. See supra Part II.B.1.
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therefore should be hesitant to conclude that a case fits these criteria.
The Court should be educated about the types of emotional
phenomena that are more complex than it may imagine, particularly
before making pronouncements affecting the decisionmaking
parameters applied to others.
We also should be alert to the ways in which the Court may use
its own commitments as the primary tool for supposing the emotional
reality of others. Justices may interpret, as in Weeks, the information
imparted by third parties' emotional signals in a manner consistent
with their own views. They also may invoke what they believe about
their emotions as if that belief applied equally to those of others,
ignoring critical differences. For example, it matters to the antisympathy instruction cases that the Court reviews death penalty
cases regularly and at a remove; capital sentencing jurors experience
only one, and directly. Even accepting (counterfactually) that the
Court should and does decide these cases "without emotion," when it
applies to jurors what it believes about its own moral decisionmaking
processes, it ignores enormous differences in emotional context.
Finally, judgments about emotion frequently will rely on
contested meaning structures as to which diversity is either allowed or
encouraged, thus enacting favoritism and imposing a false consensus.
Given that judgments as to the emotional lives of dissimilar others are
particularly likely to be distorted, they should be regarded as
especially suspect. As Justice Ginsburg points out in her Carhart
dissent, the only people to whom the majority's statements of
emotional common sense could apply are women, 23 5 and every member
of the majority, from whom the evaluation came, was a man. Folk
wisdom, already on shaky ground, is even shakier when those
invoking it are not even part of the affected "folk."
B. What Might Take the Place of Emotional Common Sense?
If the Court were to eschew emotional common sense where it
is not properly generalizable to other people, either as a description of
their reality or a boundary on their rights, what might take its place?
One plausible solution is to require that the Court resolve
disputed questions about emotional phenomena by reference to
external sources of data such as history, mind science, and the other

235. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) ('Though today's majority may regard
women's feelings on the matter as 'self-evident,' this Court has repeatedly confirmed that '[t]he

destiny of the woman must be shaped..
her place in society.' ").

.

on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and
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social sciences. 236 In evaluating the viability of this approach, it is
informative to note that the Court has sometimes sought to do just
that. It has done so in at least two situations: in judging the
Confrontation Clause implications of allowing child witnesses to
testify outside the presence of the defendant in sexual abuse cases,
and in determining the First Amendment consequences of
criminalizing cross-burning. 23 7 It is not immediately evident why the
Court has approached these particular corners of constitutional
jurisprudence in a relatively non-folk manner. But that such an
approach has at times been attempted shows the viability of
cultivating it.
In both Coy v. Iowa 238 and Maryland v. Craig239 the Court was
asked to determine whether the Confrontation Clause requires
children to provide in-court, face-to-face testimony in sexual abuse
cases even if such a requirement might cause those children "serious
emotional distress." 240 A plausible common-sense assumption would be
that such testimonial conditions would be quite traumatic, especially
for a child who is not merely a witness but has himself been sexually
abused by the defendant with whom he is faced. The Coy Court,
though, refused to accept a "legislatively imposed presumption of such
trauma."241 The Court did not dispute that such testimony would often
236. This approach is strongly suggested by supra Part II.B.
237. The Court also has avoided a commonsense approach where it would be inconsistent
with settled principles of parental autonomy. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000)
(finding unconstitutional a Washington State statute allowing any person to file petition for
forced visitation). The Troxel Court rejected as legally insufficient the Washington Superior
Court's expressly commonsensical reasoning that "it is normally in the best interest of the
children to spend quality time with the grandparent." Id. at 70 (relying on parents' right to be
the primary arbiters of what is in their children's best interest); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 853-54 (1977) (recognizing a foster parent's liberty interest "rooted in the
emotional attachments that develop over time between a child and the adults who care for him,"
but finding such interest to be "significantly weaker in the case of removals preceding return to
the natural parent").
238. 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988).
239. 497 U.S. 836, 838 (1990).
240. Id. at 841 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989))
(describing procedure in which such children could instead testify via closed circuit television);
see also Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15 (describing procedure in which children testified from behind a
screen). As discussed at infra notes 265-66 and accompanying text, the issue of trauma in
sexually abused children became highly relevant in a later case having to do with the death
penalty for persons convicted of raping children.
241. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021 (insisting instead that a "generalized finding" is no substitute for

"individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection").
Interestingly, Justice Scalia's majority opinion relied heavily on a different bit of folk wisdom:
that face-to-face confrontation of witnesses may "emotionally unstring" a "false witness" and
therefore is essential to fairness. Id. at 1019 & n.2 ('The perception that confrontation is
essential to fairness has persisted over the centuries because there is much truth to it.").
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be upsetting to the child, but it would not sign off on the proposition
that such upset was inevitable or always would reach such a level as
to justify curtailing the defendant's confrontation rights. 242 Two years
later, the Craig Court allowed some loosening of the traditional
testimonial requirements only if the trauma were shown rather than
presumed. It therefore approved Maryland's procedures for out-ofcourt testimony when the trial court makes a specific, individualized
finding that face-to-face testimony "will result in the child suffering
serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably
communicate." 243 The Court buttressed this conclusion by reference
not just to the "widespread belief in the importance of' protecting
children in that circumstance but also to a "growing body of academic
literature documenting the psychological trauma suffered by child
abuse victims who must testify in court. ' 24 4 Thus, in this area of law
the Court has been relatively careful to take a contextualized
approach that takes seriously the perspective
of trained
professionals-such as forensic psychologists-and legal personnel
closer to the ground-such as trial judges. It thus has recognized that
where the state offers emotional harm as a justification for limiting
rights, the state's assertion must be closely analyzed to ensure it is
neither overgeneralized nor specious.
In the cross-burning context the Court also has turned to
alternative sources, primarily historical materials, to illuminate the
relevant emotional context. In Virginia v. Black, the Court considered
the validity of a statute prohibiting burning a cross with the intent to
intimidate. 245 While one can imagine the Court having simply asserted
that "of course" a burning cross causes fear, the Black majority went
to some significant effort to ascertain the range of emotional reactions
by locating that act in its historical, cultural, and ideological context.
After discussion of the Ku Klux Klan, the Court concluded that a

242. Id. at 1020. This conclusion is interestingly parallel to Justice Scalia's assertion that
approaches from a sidewalk counselor will often be upsetting but that such an upset will not
necessarily (or ever) reach a constitutionally significant level. See supra Part II.B.1 for a
discussion of Scalia's view. It is also similar to the question as to whether the emotional trauma
of child rape might justify imposition of the death penalty. See infra notes 265-66 and
accompanying text for examination of this issue.
243. Craig, 497 U.S. at 841 (citing statute).
244. Id. at 853, 855 (citing, inter alia, Amicus Brief of American Psychological Association in
Support of Neither Party). The Craig court did not require any particular sort of testimony in
support of this individualized finding.
245. 538 U.S. 343, 348 (2003). "Intent to intimidate" was defined as intentionally putting "a
person or a group of persons in fear of bodily harm. Such fear must arise from the willful conduct
of the accused rather than from mere temperamental timidity of the victim." Id. at 349 (jury
instruction).
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burning cross frequently is a "tool of intimidation and a threat of
impending violence," a true threat that engenders powerful fear in its
targets. 246 States, it held, are therefore free to outlaw it when intended
to cause such fear. 247 A plurality, though, went on to invalidate the
statute because it allowed the jury to treat cross-burning as prima
facie evidence of intent to intimidate, thus allowing conviction of a
cross-burner whose sole intent was to communicate an ideological
point of view or solidarity with like-minded people. That subset of
cross-burnings, such as those at a private Klan rally, the plurality
opined, might inspire "hatred or anger" among those who learn of it,
but not fear. 248 The Black majority and plurality opinions therefore
show the Court eschewing pure emotional common sense in favor of a
more nuanced, contextually grounded, and externally validated view.
In this particular case the effort led a Court plurality to legitimate
part of the statute-some significant portion of cross-burnings is
intended to, and does, cause extreme fear-but not all of it, on the view
that some portion does not have that purpose or effect, no matter how
distasteful.
The non-folk approach modeled in these cases is better than
reliance on emotional common sense. It is better because it gives
adequate opportunity for assumptions to be challenged and allows
space for contrary voices. It also gives appropriate due to important
interests at stake-the right of a defendant to confront witnesses or
the right of a racist to express his abhorrent views-and demonstrates
that such rights are not to be abridged on the basis of supposition as
to their emotional impact on others.
But the non-folk approach is far from being a magic bullet.
Opinions still will clash, sometimes strongly. Sometimes individual
Justices will believe that the Court has not removed itself sufficiently
from the realm of common sense. In Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia
protested that the Court had been driven by "widespread belief,"
rather than being a bulwark against it; had engaged in "speculation";
and had wrongly ignored evidence that some child witnesses are
vulnerable to suggestion and fantasy, attributes that could be

246. Id. at 352-57.
247. Id. at 363 (distinguishing RAV v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which
criminalized cross-burning on the basis of its subject matter, and noting that cross-burning with
the intent to intimidate "is a particularly virulent form of intimidation" when judged "in light of
[its] long and pernicious history").
248. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366-67 (plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.) (prima facie
element of the statute "ignores all of the contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether
a particular cross burning is intended to intimidate").
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uncovered by face-to-face confrontation. 24 9 And in dissenting from
denial of certiorari in a later case, he complained that the evidentiary
standard of trauma was being satisfied by such a miniscule quantum
of proof that it was "no showing at all"-that is, that the Court had
devolved to emotional common sense while making a show of not doing
SO.

250

At other times, Justices will take issue with the scope of the
external data consulted by their fellows. As Justice Thomas makes
clear in his strongly worded Virginia v. Black dissent, even to
entertain the notion that some cross-burning causes anything other
than terror is to ignore reality from his perspective. 2 51 Agreeing with
the majority's look to history but regarding its discussion as
insufficient, 252 Thomas adds additional historical evidence, including
personal testimonials, to demonstrate his view that cross-burning
causes widespread and "well-founded fear of physical violence" and
253
nothing else, particularly for African Americans.
Herein lie the primary-and significant-limitations of seeking
support in external sources. The set of sources one consults and
regards as credible is shaped by one's priors; those sources are
themselves shaped by the values and belief systems of those who
generate them; and their conclusions often will be interpreted in such
a way as to conform to one's precommitments.
These limitations were recognized by Thomas in his Black
dissent, in which he argued that the other Justices' cultural
worldviews warped their ability to conduct a full inquiry and draw
valid conclusions from it. Even when appearing to look outside
themselves, Thomas seemed to say, other Justices are cultural
outsiders to the experience of the burning cross, and their outsider
254
status blinded them to what, to him, seemed "common knowledge."
249. Craig, 497 U.S. at 861, 868-69 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia was dissenting
from an extension of the Coy opinion he authored.
250. Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
251. 538 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
252. Id. ("[A page of history is worth a volume of logic." (quoting Justice Holmes)).
253. Id. at 390-91 (describing aftermath of cross-burning for a woman left "crying on her
knees in the living room," with "feelings of frustration and intimidation and fear[ing] for her
husband's life," as for a "black American" the burning cross meant "[m]urder, hanging, rape,
lynching"; "months after the incident, the family still lived in fear" (quoting United States v.
Skillman, 922 F.2d 1370, 1378 (9th Cir. 1991))); see also id. at 391 ("In our culture, cross burning
has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims wellgrounded fear of physical violence.").
254. Id. at 388 ("In every culture, certain things acquire meaning well beyond what outsiders
can comprehend."); id. at 389 (citing "common understanding of the Klan as a terrorist
organization"); id. at 394 (finding that "even segregationists understood the difference between
intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression").
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Further, Thomas argued, their view was so constrained that the
harms they perceived were dependent on the types of people affected.
Contrasting the Black approach to African American targets of hate
speech with the Court's efforts in Hill to guard against "emotional
trauma" to patients, he argued:
That cross burning subjects its targets, and sometimes, an unintended audience... to
extreme emotional distress, and is virtually never viewed merely as "unwanted
communication," but rather, as a physical threat, is of no concern to the plurality.
Henceforth, under the plurality's view, physical
safety will be valued less than the right
255
to be free from unwanted communications.

Touch6 indeed. Whether one agrees entirely with Justice
Thomas's characterization of the Justices in the Black plurality, or
regards him as similarly limited by his worldview, he surely is correct
that those worldviews are shaping what is perceived as important.
Thus, our effort to look beyond emotional common sense is an
imperfect one. Even when the Court looks outside itself for answers,
the way it shapes the inquiry, the evidence it finds sufficient and
credible, and the relative valuation it assigns to competing rights and
values will continue to be shaped by the Justices' worldviews. As
Justice Scalia asserted in a different context, the temptation is
enormous to "look over the heads of the crowd and pick out [one's]
friends. ' 256 Thus, the Carhart majority (which included, of course,
Justice Scalia) relied on testimonials from amicus parties with whom
it agreed. Justice Ginsburg, in her Carhart dissent, cited to a large
number of scientific studies showing that mental health outcomes for
women who have abortions are no worse than for women who choose
not to abort.25 7 The majority, had it chosen to, could have retorted to
her retort by citing other studies purporting to show just the
opposite. 258 Indeed, such studies are referenced in the cited Cano
Brief. The reality is that data sometimes are conflicting, and the
sciences-like all disciplines, including law-are affected by the

255. Id. at 400.
256. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (complaining about
the Court's choice to credit amicus briefs about neurological and psychological differences
between adolescents and adults submitted by, inter alia, the American Psychological
Association).
257. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258. See, e.g., David M. Fergusson, Abortion in Young Women and Subsequent Mental
Health, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 16, 22 (2006) (finding that having an abortion is
correlated with increased risk of mental health problems); David C. Reardon et al., Psychiatric
Admissions of Low-Income Women Following Abortion and Childbirth, 168 J. CAN. MED. ASS'N
1253, 1253 (2003) ("Overall, women who had an abortion had a significantly higher relative risk
of psychiatric admission compared with women who had delivered for every time period
examined.").
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premises of their practitioners. Further, even when relying on
empirics people tend to conform their view of the facts to their values
and to credit only that empiricism that confirms prior views. 259 There
is, therefore, a danger that recourse to empirics will make the problem
worse. It is no solution for the Court to continue to draw on its
emotional common sense but paper it over with a few cherry-picked
cites to value-confirming external sources. Such papering over can
further obscure the value-projective nature of the Court's conclusions.
Turtles upon turtles upon turtles.
We should be soberly aware of these significant limitations, but
they provide no reason to abandon the effort completely. Just as
emotional common sense sometimes reflects stable truth, empirical
evidence sometimes does weigh strongly in one direction. It often is
possible-though with perhaps more interpretive effort than courts
(particularly appellate courts) are accustomed to exerting-to separate
wheat from chaff among competing empirical stories. Bad science or
inaccurate history often can be exposed as such, and clear answers
often can be found. Sometimes common sense and the weight of
reliable external data will concur, a "delightfully harmonious
situation."260 At other times, the weight of the evidence will strongly
conflict with common sense, and in those instances Justices should
261
abandon their common sense.
A non-folk approach raises the odds of having this discussion
openly, which in turn raises the odds of correct empirical stories
(where they exist) being acknowledged and embraced. If emotional
common sense raises a smooth, white perimeter wall around legal
judgment, then the fraught, imperfect, messy world of facts, clashing
narratives, complex data, and competing rights is a climbing wall; we
can see where the climber is located and can pinpoint and take issue
259. See Kahan, supra note 56 (examining the interaction between cultural orientation and
the perception of facts); Kahan et al., supra note 130 (same); see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POLY REV. 149, 150 (2006)
(showing, inter alia, that cultural orientation predicts whether or not one believes as a factual
matter that the death penalty deters crime).
260. Meehl, supra note 33, at 95.
261. Id. In knowing in which universe we are, we would do well to heed Meehl's proposal
that "the degree of skepticism toward a dictum of commonsense psychology should increase as
we move into those areas of social control where our efforts are hardly crowned with spectacular
success." Id. at 66-67 (giving as an example the prevention and "curing" of crime). However, if
the conflicting evidence is particularly new, novel, isolated, or otherwise suspect, and the
commonsense notion a particularly engrained one, "similar skepticism should be maintained
toward experimental research purporting, as generalized, to overthrow it." Id. at 97; see also
Redding, supra note 9, at 142 (suggesting though common sense is law's "natural bedfellow" and
social science "only an occasional mistress," we still should regard the former with "healthy
scientific skepticism").
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with the specific supports to which she clings. At times, that open
battle over discernable inputs will change priors and result in
compromise and consensus. 262 When it does not, the terms of future
debate will be set.
There is, of course, another alternative. The Court can openly
defend its judgments about emotion as normative ones. 263 As this
Article has strongly suggested, this is the approach best suited to a
great many constitutional determinations, to which conflicting correct
views may attach. It is presumptively the best approach where clear
external data are unavailable, in true equipoise, or reveal a diversity
of permissible interpretations. 264 It is also the best course where there
is general consensus on the nature and prevalence of the emotional
phenomenon but disagreement on the weight it should be accorded in
the jurisprudential calculus. That is a plausible description of one
clash within Kennedy v. Louisiana, in which the Court barred
265 All
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of child rape.
concurred that child rape causes profound emotional harm, though the
dissent urged a more forceful view of that harm. 266 But the real issue
262. It is worth considering whether self-consciousness about the way in which one chooses
and interprets empiricism to conform to one's prior beliefs and values would lessen the degree to
which that is so.
263. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Seeing the Emperor's Clothes: Recognizing the Reality of
Constitutional Decision Making, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1069, 1078 (2006) (arguing that judges should
"justify and debate their value choices" rather than present them as dictated by the
Constitution).
264. See Meehl, supra note 33, at 96 ("One hardly knows what to suggest in such collision
situations except the social scientist's usual 'more research is needed.' "); Paul E. Meehl, Law
and the Fireside Inductions (with Postscript): Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, 7
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 521, 544 (1989) ('The plain fact is that some fireside inductions are sound,
others are unsound, and most are a mixture. I know of no way to find out which, when a dispute
arises, except to collect facts in the systematic manner of the social scientist.").
265. 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008), as modified, 2008 WL 4414670. This is also a plausible
description of the dispute over the legal weight to be accorded the "emotional upset" of those
targeted by anti-abortion protests.
266. Compare id. at 2658 (citing academic sources for proposition that "[r]ape has a
permanent psychological, emotional, and sometimes physical impact on the child"), with id. at
2676-77 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing legal and academic sources for propositions that the
"immaturity and vulnerability of a child, both physically and psychologically, adds a devastating
dimension to rape that is not present when an adult is raped," that "[]ong-term studies show
that sexual abuse is 'grossly intrusive in the lives of children and is harmful to their normal
psychological, emotional and sexual development,' " that "as many as 40% of 7- to 13-year-old
sexual assault victims are considered 'seriously disturbed,' " and that there are proven
"correlations between childhood sexual abuse and later problems such as substance abuse,
dangerous sexual behaviors or dysfunction, inability to relate to others on an interpersonal level,
and psychiatric illness," as well as later perpetration of sexual abuse and involvement in
prostitution). Note that Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Thomas, and Scalia all joined
Justice Kennedy's "common sense" approach to regret in Carhartbut took issue with the scope of
his empiricism with regard to the seriousness of trauma suffered by victims of child rape.
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was how such harm was to be regarded within the relevant Eighth
Amendment parameters and how it was to be compared, morally and
legally, with the harms of murder. No empiricism can answer those
questions. Certainly our answers should not rest on demonstrably
inaccurate premises, and looking for guidance from credible external
sources is better than simply invoking one's own off-the-cuff views on
deeply complex issues. Indeed, recourse to such sources may reveal
points of agreement. But we should harbor no delusions that external
data will supply all answers in the universe of conflicting correct
views, and we should demand that such views be articulated and
justified.
Transparency is, of course, its own virtue. But it is not the only
one. If forced to defend previously implicit theories (of course the world
works this way) in normative terms (I see the world in this way, and I
will require that you do as well) some Justices will, sometimes, change
course entirely. It is worth wondering whether Justice Kennedy would
have been willing in Carhart to defend openly the belief systems and
values underlying his judgments about regret. If emotional common
sense provides a ready cover for smuggling in contested meaning
structures, perhaps removing the cover will allow fewer of them to
sneak in.
One final, happy consequence of a move beyond emotional
common sense-in all but the limited domain suggested at the start of
this Part-would be a marked improvement in the quality of the
Court's rhetoric. Asserting that one's own view is commonsensical
never will persuade someone to whom it appears otherwise, but it will
instead come across as maddening, wrongheaded, even insulting.
Emotional common sense thus contributes to a legal culture in which
opinions are "marked by a rhetoric of certainty, inevitability, and
claimed objectivity, a rhetoric that denies the complexity of the
267
problem and drives to its conclusion with a tone of self-assurance."
A rhetoric that admits instead of multiple perspectives on emotional
reality is more likely to be persuasive. It also avoids the condescension
of presenting one's own views as simple truths with which all sane
persons surely must agree.

267. Gewirtz, supra note 24, at 1042. Moreover, lower courts often borrow or rely on the
Court's rhetoric, not just its holdings, and irresponsible commonsense rhetoric-particularly if it
is pithy or folksy-easily may work its way into other legal determinations in ways not
foreseeable to its author. See Guthrie, supra note 16, at 880 (" '[I]n the pit of actual
application... one good quote is worth a hundred clever analyses of the holding.' " (quoting
Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 682, 683 (1986) (book review))).
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CONCLUSION

This Article has shown that the Supreme Court uses emotional
common sense in construing constitutional law. This new lens on
constitutional jurisprudence reveals previously hidden dynamics in a
wide array of cases. The phenomenon is not isolated to any single
Justice or ideological niche of the Court; everyone does it, and they do
it to a lesser or greater degree depending on how they evaluate any
given situation in light of their beliefs, values, and goals. Emotional
common sense may be a permissible basis for law in very limited
circumstances having to do with simple emotional experiences arising
within common, consciously accessible contexts. Beyond that core,
reliance on emotional common sense may enshrine dangerous myths
into law and disserve both the complexity of human emotion and the
diversity of our pluralistic society. Members of the Court must be open
to being honestly educated about the limits of their own expertise in
emotion and must bring varying perspectives to bear in a deliberate,
transparent, nuanced, and grounded manner. They must also be
willing to air openly the many judgments underlying their commonsense views.
Such an approach is vital, for important constitutional
judgments will continue to hinge on evaluation of emotions, and the
Justices do not have-and cannot have-all the answers as a matter of
simple common sense.
The recent case of Carey v. Musladin makes this clear. In
Musladin the Court was asked to determine the permissibility of
allowing family members of the deceased, Tom Studer, to wear
buttons showing Studer's face while attending the murder trial of the
man accused of killing him. 268 The state appellate court had rejected
Musladin's objection to the buttons based on its assessment that they
"[were] unlikely to have been taken as a sign of anything other than
the normal grief occasioned by the loss of [a] family member. '269 The
oral argument was a chaotic parade of emotional common sense.
Justices Breyer and Roberts echoed the state's assertion that a typical
juror would see the buttons as just a sign of "normal grief."270 Justice
Scalia asserted that the jury would understand the buttons as a plea
to consider the case carefully because the deceased was loved and is
268. 549 U.S. 70, 72-73 (2006). Musladin argued self-defense, so Studer's "innocent victim"
status was directly at issue.
269. Id. at 73 (quoting the opinion of the California Court of Appeal).
270. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, 30, Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (No. 05-785); see also id.
at 25 (argument of Gregory A. Ott for Petitioner) ("[Slimple buttons bearing only a photo did not
convey any message of blame, guilt, anything other than grief of this family.").
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missed. 27' The Justices and the attorneys mused about the permissible
limits of emotional displays by spectators, conjecturing what rule
would obtain if the family members were to sob aloud during the
proceedings. 272 The relevance of Cohen's protection of the emotional
content of speech was briefly raised and dropped. 273 Justice Souter
wondered aloud whether the dividing line between permissible and
impermissible emotional display hinged on whether the family was
doing what people "naturally do" when grieving, as opposed to "going
out of their way to do something that people in mourning do not
normally do. '274 Competing possibilities drawn from emotional
common sense played out in the amicus briefs as well. The National
Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys insisted that the buttons
conveyed the "obvious" message that Studer was an innocent victim
and that Musladin did not act in self-defense. 2 75 In contrast, the New
Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center insisted that the buttons simply
conveyed "the message that the family was upset and mourning his
death" and would be thus "understood by jurors in a common sense
fashion." 276
271. Id. at 22 (statement of Scalia, J.) ('They just say we have been deprived of a loved one.
This is a terrible matter. Please, jury, consider this case carefully. That's all it necessarily
says."); see also id. at 22-23 (argument of Petitioner's counsel) (arguing that a jury would
understand the message in the way Scalia suggested). But see id. at 22 (argument of Petitioner's
counsel) (arguing, in response to a question from Justice Souter, that the jury would understand
the button to convey the "sentiment" that Musladin should be hanged).
272. Id. at 33-37.
273. Id. at 35.
274. Id. at 37. Souter also asserted that the real problem with the buttons was that they
raised the danger of creating "sympathy" for Studer's family, creating the risk "of emotionalism
in the jury's deliberation as opposed to dispassionate consideration of courtroom evidence" at the
guilt stage. Id. at 38; see also id. at 45-46:
[I]t created a risk simply of an emotional approach to the determination of guilt or
innocence. The jurors are more likely to feel sorry for the family members sitting there
a few feet away from them. Perhaps they may be more likely to feel sorry for the
victim, but certainly for the family members. And it would be that improper influence
of emotionalism as opposed to a particular message that is the problem here ...
The respondent's attorney first resisted this characterization, focusing instead on the
impermissible message arguably conveyed by the buttons, and then endorsed it. See id. at 46
(stating that he "d[id] accept that").
275. Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent at 9, Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (No. 05-785). Further, even accepting the Court of
Appeals' contention that the buttons displayed "normal grief," the NACDL asserted that such
displays of grief are irrelevant to issues of guilt and innocence and create too great a risk of
prejudice. Id.
276. Brief of the New Jersey Crime Victims' Law Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 3, 11, Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (No. 05-785); see also id. at 3 ("Their presence and
association with the decedent is understood, obvious, and expected. For these individuals to wear
a small button with the photo of the victim is as commonly understood as is their presence.
Common sense dictates this.").
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Musladin came to the Court through its habeas jurisdiction, so
the Court was able to dodge all of these questions by finding that the
state court's determination was not unreasonable because the proper
course had yet to be clearly established. 277 The question, and others
like it, surely will come back. In the meantime, lower courts have no
greater guidance than before, and the jurisprudence on allowable
278
emotional displays in the courtroom will remain a morass.
Emotional common sense-imperfect, invisible, value-laden--cannot
possibly be the best way to decide difficult issues of such import.
There is a better way: recognizing the dangers of emotional
common sense and being willing sometimes to set it aside. This path
does not require that we eschew a role for emotion in law, including
constitutional law. What it requires is that we take a more catholic
view toward the sources of information about emotions, and a more
humble view toward the universality of our own.

277. 549 U.S. at 76-77; see also id. at 82 (Souter, J., concurring) (raising same questions
about the risk of creating in jurors a "sympathetic urge to assuage the grief or rage of survivors
with a conviction," and wondering if the spectators might have a First Amendment right to
express grief).
278. Id. at 76 (acknowledging that "lower courts have diverged widely in their treatment of
defendants' spectator-conduct claims"). A similar point pertains to the proper limits on victim
impact evidence. Though such evidence generally has been allowed despite its evidently
emotional character, see supra note 121 (documenting the Court's treatment of victim impact
evidence), it may be excluded if "so unduly prejudicial" as to render the trial "fundamentally
unfair." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 809, 825 (1991). The Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari in two cases in which capital sentencing jurors were shown video montages of the
victims' lives, complete with music and narration. See Kelly v. California, 129 S. Ct. 564, 564
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (attaching a link to one of the videos, http:/www
.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/videolkelly.vcalifornia.html). The Supreme Court of California
opined that the videos were "not unduly emotional." People v. Kelly, 171 P.3d 548, 558 (Cal.
2007). Justices Stevens and Breyer perceived the videos' overt emotionality-particularly the use
of music and other enhancements-as crossing the line (blurrily) drawn in Payne. Kelly, 129 S.
Ct. at 567-68 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he film's personal, emotional, and artistic
attributes themselves create the legal problem. They render the film's purely emotional impact
strong, perhaps unusually so... the due process problem of disproportionately powerful emotion
is a serious one[."); see also id. at 564, 567 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's lost
opportunity to provide "long-overdue guidance" on such emotionally laden evidence).

